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ABSTRACT 
This essay examines the treatment of intellectual property rights under the Commerce Act 
1986. In doing so this essay explores the scope of the rights granted and the interface 
between competition law and policy and intellectual property law and policy. This essay 
analyses how the intellectual property rights exemptions would be treated by the courts in 
New Zealand. This essay looks at the types of conduct intellectual property rights owners 
could undertake that would be likely to be an abuse of competition law. How intellectual 
property rights have been treated by competition law in other jurisdictions is also 
examined, with a particular focus on refusals to license. This essay argues that a largely 
protective approach to intellectual property rights should be taken by competition law and 
policy. This essay argues that express intellectual property rights exclusions are de irable 
in competition law. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, abstract and annexures) 
comprises approximately 15 OOO words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property rights grant the holder an exclusive right to use the intellectual 
property for a set period of time. 1 It is this exclusive right that is often referred to as a 
monopoly right and therefore seen as contrary competition law and policy. 
The need to grant exclusive rights in order to promote innovation is said to be 
relatively widely accepted, but defining the boundaries is more difficult.2 In New Zealand 
this boundary is set by the Commerce Act 1986 (The Act). The Act does not control the 
granting of intellectual property rights but only the way the rights holders exercise those 
rights. The Act has specific exclusions for the exercise of intellectual property rights.3 
The mere existence of an intellectual property right does not necessarily confer a 
market power and is not necessarily antithetical to competition policy.4 Competition law is 
concerned with where the intellectual property rights holder gains collateral advantages to 
the intellectual property right. Thi s essay examines how the intellectual property 
exclusions in the Act are intended to function , and how they could function in practice. 
1 In New Zealand patents can be granted for up to 20 years, designs are granted for up to 15 years, most 
forms of copyright protection are for 50 years after the death of the author and trade marks are perpetually 
renewable upon payment of renewal fees. 
2 Massimiliano Gangi "Competition Poli cy and the Exercise of Intell ectual Property Rights" (UNCT AD, 
Geneva, 1999) <www .unctad.org/en/docs/c2clp99d I O.pdf> (las t accessed 22 March 2002) 358. 
3 Commerce Act 1986, s 36(3) and s 45. 
4 Will ard Tom Competition Policy and /11tel/ectual Property Rights (OECD, Pari s, 1998) 
<www.oecd.org/daf/clp/roundtables/IPR-GD.PDF > (las t accessed 22 March 2002) 23, 22. L.F. Hampton 
4ed Butterworths Commercial Law In New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 2000) 674 . Douglas C. 
Calhoun and Brendan W. F. Brown "New Zealand: Interface Between Misu e of a Dominant Pos ition and the 
Exerci e of Intellectual Property Rights"' [ 1990] EIPR 437. 
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II INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Intellectual property is a general term given to creations of the mind. The term 
includes patents, trade marks, designs and copyright.5 Individual intellectual property 
statutes control the granting of intellectual property rights in New Zealand.6 There are two 
important aspects of intellectual property rights. They are the granting of intellectual 
property rights, and if granted, the way in which those exclusive rights are exercised. 
A The Scope of the Right Granted 
Trade marks can be registered if they are distinctive.7 Once registered, a trade mark 
gives the proprietor the exclusive right to use the trade mark in application to the specified 
goods and/or services. 8 
Patents can be registered if they are novel and inventive.9 Once granted, a patent 
gives the proprietor the exclusive right to make, use and sell the invention for up to 20 
years. 10 
5 The World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO) defines intellectual property to include: literary, artistic and 
scientific works; performances of performing artists , phonograms and broadcast ; inventions in all fields of 
human endeavour; scientific discoveries; industrial designs; trade marks, service marks, and commercial 
names and designations; protection against unfair competition: and all other rights resulting from intellectual 
activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic field . 
6 Namely the Trade Marks Act l 953, the Patents Act 1953, the Designs Act 1953, Plant Variety Rights Act 
1987 and the Layout Designs Act 1994. Copyright cannot be registered in New Zealand, but automatically 
applies to "works" that are original under the Copyright Act 1994. Common law protection is also available 
under the tort of passing off, and also protection for trade secrets and know how is available under a breach 
of confidence action. 
7 Trade marks must be "capable of being repre ented graphically and capable of di stinguishing the goods and 
services of one trader from those of another": Trade Marks Act 1953, s 2 under the definition of a "sign". 
8 Trade Marks Act 1953, s 8. 
9 Patents Act 1953, s 2( I ). "Invention" means any manner of new manufacture the subject of letters patent 
and grant of privilege within section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies and any new method or process of testing 
applicable to the improvement or control of manufacture; and includes an alleged invention. Novel means not 
previously published, which has the meaning of being "available to the public": Patents Act 1953, s 2. 
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Designs must be new or original in order to be registered. 11 A registered design gives 
the owner the exclusive right to make, sell, import, sell or hire the article to which the 
design has been applied, or to license the design. 12 
Copyright automatically applies to original works. 13 Copyright gives the author the 
right to reproduce his or her work, 14 and the right to prevent others from copying that work 
also. 15 Copyright only applies to the particular expression of an idea, not the idea itself. 16 
These prerequisites of "distinctiveness", "inventiveness" and "originality" act as a 
check on the scope of the monopoly granted. Intellectual property rights conferred by 
statute are limited by the necessary standards that must be met in order to obtain the rights 
to exclusive exploitation. 
It could be said that because the rights granted in intellectual property are exclusive, 
that intellectual property rights are monopoly rights. However, judges and registration 
authorities consistently try to strike a balance between, granting exclusive rights, and the 
public interest in allowing community access to the benefits of intellectual progress. 17 
10 See Patent Regulations 1954, Letter Patent, 3rd Schedule. 
11 See Designs Act I 953 , s 5(2). 
12 Designs Act 1953, s 11. 
13 Copyright Act 1994, s 14. 
14 Copyright Act 1994, s 16. 
15 Copyright Act 1994, s 29 to s 41. 
16 University of London Press Ltd v University Turoria/ Press Ltd [ 1916) 2 Ch 60 I. 
17 Tot Toys Lrd v Mirche/1 [ 1993) I NZLR 325,340 (HC) per Fisher J. 
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B The Justification for Exclusive Rights 
The justification for granting such exclusive rights is that this exclusivity is an 
incentive to create superior products and processes. This in turn promotes economic 
advance and consumer welfare. 18 The intellectual property right is a reward to the rights 
holder for his or her intellectual effort. 19 
Without exclusivity others would be free to copy and free ride off the efforts of 
creators and innovators. Then there would be less incentive to create or innovate. 
Improvement of consumer welfare, which is a goal of competition policy and intellectual 
property law,20 may suffer. 21 
The ability to exclude imitation is said to be the most important aspect of the 
property right granted to the innovator.22 In 1769 in the context of copyright, but a 
18 Rhonda Smith "Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights'' (l 996) 26 Intellectual Property 
Forum 14, 14; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Competition Policy and 
Intellectual Property Rights (OECD, Paris, 1989) l l (OECD) . Office of Fair Trading Intellectual Property 
Rights: a Draft Competition Act 1998 Guideline (Office of Fair Trading, United Kingdom, 2001) I (The 
United Kingdom Guidelines) . 
19 Douglas C. Calhoun and Brendan W.F. Brown above n 4, 437; Kamal Puri "Australian Copyright and 
Competition Policy: The Interface" [1991] 13 EIPR 413, 414. The implied legislative objectives of 
intellectual property rights (in this instance the Judge was referring to the Patents Act 1953, the Designs Act 
1953 and the then Copyright Act 1962) were said to, in Tot Toys v Mitchell above n 17, 340, per Fisher J , 
require a: 
careful balancing of rewards for individual ingenuity, research and development on the one 
hand against the public interest in sharing the benefits of intellectual progress and 
competition on the other. 
20 Douglas C. Calhoun and Brendan W. F. Brown above n 4,437. 
21 Andrew Duncan "Economics of Intellectual Property" in Review of Industrial Property Rights Patents, 
Trade Marks and Designs: Possible Options for Reform (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 1990) 6. Free 
riding creates market failure, where the optimal allocation of resources is not met. For example if books 
could be freely copied, no one would have as great of an incentive to produce a book, as there would never 
be any return for that book. If a creator or innovator cannot receive a return for their efforts, then he or she is 
unlikely to make such efforts again. 
22 OECD above n 18, 11. The importance of protecting trade marks from duplication was emphasised by the 
High Court of New Zealand in the ea e of Lel'i Strauss & Co v Kimbyr I11Festme11ts [ 1994] 1 NZLR 332, 362 
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statement that is equally applicable to all the types of intellectual property, it was observed 
that "[i]t is certainly not agreeable to natural justice, that a stranger should reap the 
beneficial pecuniary produce of another man's work."23 Furthermore, intellectual property 
is easily copied and duplicated. 24 The marginal cost of reproducing intellectual property is 
small. It is much more difficult to enforce rights in intellectual property than for other 
types of property. 
Intellectual property rights also encourage the holder to disclose the details of his or 
her creation or invention.25 In the absence of strong intellectual property rights, firms 
would inefficiently tend to allocate resources to those innovative activities which can most 
easily be kept secret.26 Innovation is also highly based on improvements on existing 
products or processes. If current innovations are kept secret, then improvements cannot be 
made. 
(HC) when quoting from two United States academics Landes and Posner in Lande and Po ner "Trade Mark 
Law: An Economic Perspective" (1989) 21 Intellectual Property Law Review 229: 
If the law does not prevent it, free riding will eventually destroy the information embodied in 
a trade mark, and the prospect of free riding may therefore eliminate the incentive to develop 
a valuable trade mark in the first place. 
23 Millarv Taylor ( 1776) 4 Burr 2303, 2334; 98 ER 20 I, 218. 
24 Andrew Duncan above n 21, 6; United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commi sion 
(USDOJFTC) "Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property" (United States, 6 April 1995) 
<www.usdoj.gov/atr/guidelines/ipguide.htm> (last accessed 24 April 2002) 3, 3; Intellectual Property and 
Competition Review Committee Review of Intellectual Property Legislation under the Competition 
Principles Agreement: Final Report by the Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee 
(Ministry of Industry, Science and Resources, Au Lralia, 2000) 23; Landes and Posner above n 22, 229 cited 
in Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr Investments above n 22, 361 - 362; Canadian Bureau of Competition "Draft 
Guidelines for the Treatment of Intellectual Property Rights Under the Competition Act" (Canadian Bureau 
of Competition , Canada, 1999) <http://strategis .ic.gc.ca> (last accessed 22 April 2002). 
25 The following quote from the Court of Appeal in Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v 
Commissioner of Patents [2000] 2 NZLR 529, 532, per Gault J, aptly summarise the justification for the 
patent system: 
The patent system rests of the policy that a limited-term monopoly will be granted as an 
incentive to innovation but subject to the invention and the best method of carrying it out 
being disclo ed and made available for public use at the end of the term of protection. 
26 Massimiliano Gangi above n 2, 356. 
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III THE INTERFACE 
Intellectual property rights are "deliberately anti competitive".27 Competition law is 
said to "despise" the exercise of monopoly power that is integral to protecting intellectual 
property rights. 28 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) believes the 
obvious conflict between competition law and intellectual property law can be reconciled if 
consumer welfare is viewed in the long run. 29 The theory goes like this: long-run consumer 
welfare depends on the dynamic efficiency of the economy. Dynamic efficiency includes 
the invention and commercial introduction of new products and processes which enhance 
welfare by increasing the quality of goods and promoting growth through increased 
productive efficiency, in other words, the protection of intellectual property. 30 In the long-
run, the protection of intellectual property is necessary for the growth and efficiency of the 
economy, and the protection of intellectual property outweighs any short-term gains of 
increased competition.31 This would appear to be consistent with the purpose of the Act, 
namely, to promote competition in markets for the long-term benefit of consumers within 
New Zealand. This change to dynamic efficiency in the Act is arguably con istent with the 
long term benefits of intellectual property protection. 
27 Phi lips Electronics NV v Ing man Ltd [ 1999] 26 FSR I 12, 125, para 35, per Laddie J. 
28 Philip Tucker "Refusal to License Intellectual Property Rights and the Misuse of Markel Power" [ 1999] 10 
AIPJ 78, 79. 
29 OECD above n 18 , 11 . 
30 See OECD above n 18 for a detailed discu sion of intellectual property rights protection and competition 
policy. 
31 Philip Tucker in his article .. Refusal Lo Licen e Intellectual Property Rights and Misu e of Market Power -
Where is the Line in the Sand·' above n 28, 79, gives a similar description of the goals of intellectual property 
and competition policy. He refers to intellectual property rights as pro-competitive in a "prospective·' sense. 
He states that by rewarding improved products and processes, competitors must strive to develop more 
efficient processes and superior products or be left behind. Competition law on the other hand aim to 
increase competition and efficiency by shunning anti competitive conduct. The pro-competitive effects are 
realised immediately, or at least in the short term. Whereas the benefits of intellectual property protection 
may only be realised in the long-term. 
I I 
Intellectual property rights have even been said to not be anti-competitive, but 
actually pro-competitive. The incentive to innovate, and gain intellectual property 
protection before others, can spur competition between competitors.32 A fear of losing 
market share to competitors who innovate can spur competition to produce the latest 
products.33 
IV SECTION 36 OF THE COMMERCE ACT 1986 
Section 36(2) of the Act prevents a person that has a substantial degree of power in a 
market from taking advantage of that power for one of the proscribed purposes. Section 
36(3) provides an exemption for intellectual property rights owners from section 36(2) if 
the person seeks to enforce a statutory intellectual property right. 34 There is little case law 
in New Zealand considering the interaction or worldngs of the intellectual property right 
exclusions. An example of an intellectual property rights holder seeking only to enforce a 
statutory intellectual property right35 however, could be the holder suing for infringement 
of his or her patent, trade mark, design or copyright. 
The relevant questions in relation to intellectual property rights that would have to be 
asked under section 36 are: 
1. What is the relevant market? 
2. Does the intellectual property rights holder have a substantial degree of power in that 
market? 
32 Philip Tucker above n 28, 79; Andrew Duncan above n 2 1, 9. InLellectual Property and CompeLition 
Review Committee above n 24, 24. See al o the quoLe above from William J in Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr 
In vestments above n 22, 36 1 in relation Lo trade mark being pro-compeLiLive. 
33 OECD above n 18, 12. 
34 For Lhe purposes of this secLion, a person docs noL Lake advantage of a subsLanLial degree of power in a 
markeL by reason only Lhat Lhe person seeks Lo enforce a sLatutory intellec tual property righL, within Lhe 
meaning of s 45(2), in New Zealand. 
35 A "statuLory intellectual property right" is defined ins 45(2), which is annexed as Annex II. 
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3. Did the competitor take advantage of that market power for the purpose of 
(a) restricting entry; 
(b) preventing or deterring a person from engaging in competitive conduct; or 
(c) eliminating a person from that market? 
4. If all of the above are satisfied, did the competitor take advantage of a substantial 
degree of power in a market by reason only that he or she eeks to enforce a statutory 
intellectual property right? If so, then the conduct is excluded from scrutiny.36 
V SECTION 36(2) 
While there is no case law on the question in New Zealand, in other jurisdi ctions, the 
mere holding of an intellectual property right does not equate to a substanti al degree of 
power in a market or dominant position in a market. 37 This is consistent with Electricity 
36 If one and two are sati sfi ed it may prudent to go straight to questi on four to establi sh if the competitor was 
seeking to enforce a statutory intell ectual property ri ght. There may be no point in asse s ing if the conduct 
was for one of the proscribed purposes, if that conduct is excluded because the competitor was onl y seeking 
to enforce hi s or her statutory intellectual property ri ght. It may also be appropri ate to ask question fo ur first, 
before one and two, to assess if the conduct was merely enfo rcing a tatutory inte ll ectual property ri ght. Thi 
essay assumes that the questi ons should be asked one through to four. 
37 In New Zealand , Commerce Act, s 36 and Au tra li a, Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 46, the standard is 
taking advantage of a "substantial degree of power in a market". While in the European Commun ity (EC) 
under Arti cle 86 of the Treaty of Rome (now Arti cle 82 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. As of I August 1999, 
the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed, replacing the Treaty of Rome) and in the United Kingdom un der the 
Chapter II of the Competiti on Act 1998, the standard is abuse of a dominalll posi ti on. 
The United States "Antitrust Guideline for the Li censing of Intell ectual Property" (Antitrust Guideline ) 
issued by the Department of Justi ce and the Federal Trade Commi ss ion (The Agencies) clearl y set out that 
they will not pre ume that a patent, copyri ght or trade secret necessa ril y confers market power on its owner: 
USDOJFfC above n 24, 4. The AnLitrust Guidelines onl y appl y to patents, copyri ght know how agreements 
and trade secrets. 
The European Court of Justi ce has also fo und that the mere ownership of intell ectual property does not itself 
confer a dominant pos ition: Radio Telefis Eireann and another v European Commission (Intellectual 
Property Owners Inc and another intervening) (Joined cases C-24 1-242/9 1 P) [ 1995) All ER 4 16, [ 1995) 
FSR 530, para 46 (Magill ). 
The Intell ectual Property and Competition Rev iew Committee in Australi a also states that harm to 
competition should not be inferred from the mere ex istence of an exc lusive ri ght such as intell ectual property: 
Intell ectual Property & Competiti on Rev iew Committee "Interim Report" (Intell ectual Property & 
Competiti on Rev iew Committee, Attorn ey General s Department, April 2000) 25. 
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Corp Ltd v Geotherm Energy Ltd38 (Geotherm) where "something more" than the exercise 
of legal rights is needed for the conduct to fall within section 36(2) of the Act.39 
There is an important difference between exclusive legal rights and the ability to 
exercise market power.40 The intellectual property rights may create exclusivity but market 
power stems only from the demand for the property.4 1 
A Market Power 
Market power is said to be the ability profitably to maintain prices above or output 
below, competitive levels , for a significant period of time.42 Intellectual property rights 
owners are not free from the constraint of competition, by reason of their exclusive rights. 
Engaging in research and development is part of competing to innovate.43 
The Offi ce of Fair Trading in their guidelines (The United Kingdom Guidelines) tale that the mere ex istence 
of an intellectual property ri ght is not anti competiti ve: Office of Fair Trading above n 18, 3. 
38 Electricity Corp Ltd v Geotherm Energy Ltd [ 1992] 2 NZLR 64 1 (CA) (Geoth erm). 
39 See below for a further di scussion of Geotherm. 
40 OECD above n 18, 16. 
4 1 Chri stopher Stothers submits that fo r most intell ectual property ri ghts, the "monopoly" right does not give 
monopoly power on any relevant market, but merely over the use of the intell ectual property. He state the 
value of the ri ght is determined by the competiti ve process on the relevant market, as with any other product: 
Christopher Stothers "The End of Exclusivity? Abuse of Intell ectual Property Rights in the E.U" [2002] 
EIPR 24(2) 86, 92. 
42 USDOJFTC above n 24, 4. The concept of market power was di scussed in Eastern Express Pty Ltd v 
General Newspapers Pry Ltd ( J 992) 35 FCR 43, 62 - 63 where Lockhart and Gummow JJ stated: 
Market power is concerned with power which enables a corporati on to behave independentl y 
of competition and of the competiti ve fo rces in a relevant market. 
Cited in Brooker 's Gault on Commercial Law Vo lume I (Brooker's, Wellington, 1994) CA36.09, 3- 147. 
43 Philip Tucker above n 28, 79; Andrew Duncan above n 2 1, 9. Intell ectual Property and Competition 
Review Committee above n 24. 24. 
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In Me/way Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd, 44 (Me/way) and cited with 
approval in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd,45 Hill J accepted that market power is generally the ability to act freely 
from the constraints of competition. However, he conceded that market power may exi t 
for other reasons, such as legislation which gives a statutory monopoly. He goes on to say 
that merely because a firm enjoys freedom from competitive constraint, and refuses to 
supply, there is not necessarily a relevant connection between the freedom and the refusal , 
especially if it is done to secure business advantages which would exist in a competitive 
environment. 
A similar sentiment to that expressed in Melway in relation to a business advantage, 
was expressed by Advocate-General Jacobs in Oscar Bronner Gmbh and others v 
E C . . 46 (O B ) " . . d ,, 47 uropean ommisswn scar ronner as a compet1t1ve a vantage . 
Where an intellectual property rights owner had created a product that was superior 
to others, forcing the intellectual property ri ghts owner to supply would seem unfair in the 
absence of unreasonable or illegal use of their intellectual property. The United States 
Agencies Guidelines give direction where a patent or other form of intellectual property 
confers a market power.48 
44 Me/way Publishing Pry Ltd v Robert Hicks Pry Ltd [200 I] J 78 ALR 253, 269 (Me/way). 
45 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music Australia Pry Ltd (2001 J FCA 
1800, para 408. 
46 Oscar Bronner GmbH and others v European Commission (Case C - 7197) ( 1998) ECJ CELEX LEXIS 
I 0911 , para 65 , per Ad vocate-General Jacobs (Osca r Bronner). 
47 Oscar Bronner above n 46, para 65 , per Ad vocate-General Jacobs. He states that in response to a refu sal to 
supply, it is not suffi cient Lo argue that the undertaking's control over a facility should give it a competiti ve 
advantage, to warrant granting supply. 
48 USDOJFfC above n 24 , 4 . 
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As with any tangible or intangibk asset that enables its owner to obtain supracompetitive 
profits, market power (or even a monopoly) that is solely "a consequence of a superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident"49 does not violate antitrust laws. 
The United Kingdom has a similar approach to that of the United States. In the 
United Kingdom "[s]uccessful innovation will naturally lead to an undertaking earning 
post-innovation profits significantly higher than its competitors."50 And further: 51 
In markets where undertakings regularly improve the quality of their products, a persistently 
high market hare may indicate no more than persistently successful innovation. 
Take the example of Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd52 
(Queensland Wire). Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP) produced approximately 97% of the 
steel made in Australia and supplied about 85% of Australia's requirements for steel and 
steel products. BHP had a substantial degree of market power and refused to supply its Y-
bar product to Queensland Wire Industries. 
If BHP had intellectual property protection the result may have been different. Their 
refusal to supply may have been justified by the exclusive rights granted in intellectual 
property rights, their profits being the result of successful innovation. 
There may be situations however where it is not possible for new entrants to enter the 
market, because the intellectual property rights owner will have the exclusive right to 
make, use and sel I the product. However, other manufacturers are often free to make other 
products, just not products that are identical or similar to the products with intellectual 
49 United States v Grinnell Corporation (1966) 384 U.S. 563, 571 . 
50 Office of Fair Trading above n 18, 15 - 16. 
51 Office of Fair Trading above n 18, 13. In the United Kingdom, the Director General of the Office of Fair 
Trading does not consider there is an abuse of a dominant position where a proprietor of an intellectual 
property right holds a dominant position and it charges a higher selling price or royalty rate for a product, 
process or work protected by its intellectual property right as compared with a product, process or work not 
protected by an intellectual property right: Office of Fair Trading above n I 8, 16. 
52 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill P()' Co Ltd ( I 989) 167 CLR 177 (Queensland Wire). 
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property rights attached to them. This could be applied to the Queensland Wire situation. If 
the Y-bar were subject to an intellectual property right, other traders could not make a Y-
bar identical or similar to the Y-bar, but they would be free to use their innovation to make 
a product that is different. 
B Intellectual Property Rights and Market Power 
One academic has stated "it was once believed that intellectual property laws gave 
the owners of intellectual property a legal or economic monopoly".53 He goes onto say that 
it is now accepted that intellectual property laws do not clash with competition laws 
because they do not create legal or economic monopolies.54 
A New Zealand commentator would tend to agree that the "monopoly" given to the 
owner of an intellectual property right is merely an exclusive property ri ght.55 
Different types of intellectual property may constitute a market in themselves when 
there is no effective substitute for the goods or servi ces and where there is a genuine 
53 Professor All an Fels Intellectual Property, Competition and Trade Implications of Parallel Importing 
Restrictions Speech to Meeting on Competition, Trade & Development 
<www.accc.gov.au/speeches/2001/Fels_Rome_June_22_200 l .htm> (last acces ed 22 March 2002). 
54 Professo r All an Fels above n 53. It is widely agreed that intellectual property ri ghts are no more 
exclusionary or monopoli sti c that any other system of property ri ghts: Jo hua Gans, Philip Willi ams and 
David Briggs Clarifying the Relationship Between lntelfectual Property Rights and Competition: Report 
Prepared f or Submission to th e Review of Intellectual Property and Competition (Frontier Economics, 
Australia, February 2000) 2; OECD above n 18, 12. Pro fessor Allan Fe ls states that intellectual property laws 
merely create property ri ghts in goods or services produced u ing intell ectual property to compete in the 
market with other goods or services. 
55 Yvonne van Roy Guidebook to New Zealand Competition Laws (Commercial C learing House, New 
Zeal and Ltd , Auckl and , 199 1) 30. She reconciles the differences in po licy by ex plaining that a "monopoly" 
in a competition law sense, is not something that an intell ectual property ri ghts owner necessaril y has. She 
explains th e "monopoly" in intellectual property as an exc lusive ri ght, but in competiti on law: 
" [M]onopoly" refers to contro l o f a market, something which the holder o f a "monopoly" 
ri ght in intell ectual property may or may not have. 
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demand for supply for the purposes of manufacture of secondary goods or services for 
which there is demand.56 
Following is a comparison of the exclusive rights awarded in the individual 
intellectual property rights, versus market power in competition law. 
1 Trade marks 
Trade marks are merely applied to goods or services. For example, the trade mark 
COCA-COLA is merely applied to a beverage. In the absence of any other intellectual 
property rights, other traders are free to make cola flavoured beverages, but must not refer 
to it in the same or a similar manner as COCA-COLA.57 
It seems unlikely that a trade mark would ever constitute a market in itself, as other 
traders are free to refer to their products in other ways, provided they are not the same or 
simi lar. This demonstrates the difference between the relevant "market" in a competition 
Jaw sense and the exclusive rights granted in intellectual property. 
2 Designs 
Registered designs concern the aesthetics of a product. For example, if Holden have 
a registered design in the look of a bumper, this only prevents other traders from making 
bumpers that look identical. It does not prevent other competitors from making bumpers. 
56 Magill cited in Philip Tucker above n 28, 90. Christopher Stothers above n 41, 92, submits that even if 
there are not substitutes avai lab le, there are usually potential substitutes available. 
57 In terms of the monopoly granted by trade marks, The High Court of New Zealand in Levi Strauss & Co v 
Kimbyr Inves1me11ts above n 22, 361, has found that the idea that a trade mark is a form of monopoly i a 
misnomer. William J in Le1•i Strauss & Co v Kimbyr lnves1me111s above n 22, 361, approved the following 
passage from Holmes J in United Drug Company v Theodore TecTanus Company ( 1918) 248 US 90, 98: 
In truth, a trade mark confers no monopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is merely a 
convenient means for facilitating the protection of one's good will in trade by placing a 
distinguishing mark or symbol - a commercial signature - upon the merchandise or the 
package in which it is sold. 
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In theory, there should be plenty of other ways a competitor could make a bumper that 
does not infringe Holden ' s registered design. 
The scope of the design protection would be of more concern where an independent 
manufacturer, wi shes to compete on the spare parts market of another manufacturer, who 
has registered designs. This is similar to the situation in Volvo AB v Erik Veng (UK.) Ltd58 
(Volvo). Volvo had registered designs in the parts of their cars. Volvo refused to grant 
Veng a licence to supply replacement parts, namely body panels, for Volvo automobile . In 
that case, Volvo was entitled to use its registered design protection to refuse to supply the 
independent repairer. 
Other competitors may find it difficult to make spare parts compatible with Volvo 
cars, without infringing Volvo' s regi stered design.59 A potenti al competitor wanting to 
compete in markets for particular types of car parts, may find them elves constrained by 
the registered design rights. On the other hand, a competitor competing on the car market, 
is able to make cars provided they are not identical to the registered designs of other 
manufacturers. There is a di stinction then in the market concerned, for example, the car 
market in general, or the market for parts of a particular brand of cars. One is particularly 
more constrained by intellectual property ri ghts than the other. 
3 Copyright 
Copyright confers the power to exclude with respect to the specific work in 
question.60 
58 Volvo AB v Erik Veng ( U K. ) Ltd [ 1988] ECR 62 11 (Volvo) . 
59 If the spare parts look s imil ar, then presumable they would infringe the registered des ign . Presumably the 
spare parts would have to look similar in order to fi t or match with the re t of the car. 
60 USDOJFfC above n 24, 4. Copyri ght has been described by Lord Bridge of Harwich in the Pri vy Council 
in Green v Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand [ l 989] 3 NZLR 18, 19, q uoting Farwell J in Tate v 
Fullbrook (1 908] I KB 82 1,832, as a monopo ly, as: 
[T]he protecti on which copyri ght gives creates a monopoly, and " there must be certainty in the 
subj ect mauer o f such monopoly in order to avoid uch injusti ce to the rest of the world". 
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There will often be sufficient actual or potential close substitutes for the work to 
prevent the exercise of market power however. 61 For example, there may be other books, 
paintings or music available.62 
4 Patents 
Patents relate to inventions, namely a method of manufacture. A patent g1Ves the 
proprietor the power to exclude others with respect to the specific product or process.63 
Patent case law would tend to indicate that patents are monopolies.64 
This tendency to refer to a patent as a monopoly is said to be ebbing however. 65 For 
example, the grant of a pharmaceutical patent does not generally block the creation of 
alternative treatments.66 If the patent is ufficiently broad, then in theory this could 
constitute an entire market. If the patent covers the entire field, then it may be difficult for 
61 USDOJFTC above n 24, 4. 
62 In the case of Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music Australia Pry Limited 
above n 45 , the question of substitutability of popular music arose. While there was no market survey to 
support the evidence, the general view of all witnesses was that majority of cu tomers went to buy a 
particular title and did not want some other title. If title they wanted was not available, they would go 
elsewhere. It was considered in that case that to be "common ground" that no two music titles were perfect 
substitutes for one another: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music Australia 
Pty Limited above n 45, para 383. In Magill the copyright protection was long, and the usefulness of the 
copyright material very short. Each television company had a de facto monopoly in each television listing. It 
was not possible for any competitor to compile any sort of television guide without infringing the 
broadcasting companies' copyright. Similarly in IMS Health Inc v Commission of the European Communities 
(TI84/0 I R) (No. 2) [2002) 4 CMLR 2 (IMS Health). Any provision of information which fitted the format 
required by the pharmaceutical companies, would have infringed the copyright. 
63 USDOJFTC above n 24, 4. 
64 McMullin J in Wei/come Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [ 1983] NZLR 385, 398 (CA) stated 
that "[t]he grant of a patent is the grant of a monopoly". Or at least patents are limited monopolies. In 
Wei/come Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents above, 389, Cooke J tated "[t]he award of limited 
monopolies is a standard way of helping to compensate for the expense of research." 
65 Willard Tom above n 4, 23. 
66 Christopher Stothers above n 41, 92. 
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other manufacturers to invent or manufacture round the patent without infringing the patent 
owner's exclusive rights. However, there are often substitutes available. 
Significant market power from a patent is seen as the exception rather than the rule. 6
7 
Firstly the patent must be commercially viable, and secondly there may be substitutes 
available or the ability to "invent around" the patent, which may weaken the intellectual 
property rights owner's market power armoury.68 Therefore it eems rare that the patent 
alone would constitute a market or market power. 
C The Test for Substantial Degree of Power in a Market 
The test in Queensland Wire for substantial degree of power in a market was put in 
this way: was the conduct something that only a firm with a substantial degree of market 
power could or would do? 69 
In relation to an intellectual property right, the firm would mo t likely be using their 
intellectual property right in the manner anticipated. That is, using the exclusive rights to 
gain a competitive advantage. 70 
67 OECD above n I 8, 16 - I 7. 
68 Gault J alludes to the lack of assurance of commercial success of patents in Pharmaceutical Management 
Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Patents above n 25, 532. He also states that the invention may well be 
superceded, [presumably by a superior invention] before the expiry of the patent term. Gault J goes onto tate 
that "only on a short-term and narrow perspective can that be regarded as restrictive of competition": 
Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd v Commissioner of Pat ems above n 25, 532 - 533, per Gault J. 
69 Queensland Wire above n 52. The question was asked in Queensland Wire wa whether the firm would 
have been likely to behave in the same manner in a competitive market (without the market power). In the 
more recent ea e Me/way the test was framed in this manner: was the conduct in question "materially 
facilitated by the existence of the market power. even though it may not have been absolutely impossible 
without the power?" . The approach in Me/way has been approved by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
Carter Holt Harvey Building Products Croup Ltd 1• Commerce Commission (200 I) I O TCLR 247 and 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission (200 I) I O TCLR 182. 
70 In Magill above n 37, despite finding that the mere ownership of intellectual property docs confer a 
dominant position, there was a finding of a dominant position. The appellants had a de facto monopoly over 
the information used to compile listings for the television programmes received in most households in Ireland 
and 30% to 40% of households in Northern Ireland. Each television listing was a monopoly as there was no 
other way of ourcing the television listings , and no way of producing a television guide, that included the 
listings, without infringing copyright. The appellants were said to be in a position to prevent effective 
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In relation to conduct of an intellectual property right owner, the question could be 
asked: is the intellectual property rights owner's conduct something that only a firm with 
an intellectual property right could or would do? This would be begging the question and 
as one commentator has suggested, the Queensland Wire test is not appropriate for 
intellectual property, because the intellectual property rights owner should be the only 
person who can undertake that conduct.71 Philip Tucker prefers to put the test in this way: 
"is the conduct complained of a legitimate use of the intellectual property right having 
regard to which of, and in what manner, the market(s) have been affected by this conduct?" 
Tucker's test is in fact remarkably similar to the question that must be asked under section 
36(3), is the statutory intellectual property right owner merely seeking to enforce his or her 
intellectual property right, namely, a legitimate use of the intellectual property right. 
D Taking Advantage 
In Queensland Wire "taking advantage of' was said to mean "use".72 Therefore if an 
intellectual property rights owner was found to have a substantial degree of power in a 
market, they would have to be using that power for section 36 to apply. Further, he or she 
would have to be using it for one of the proscribed purposes. 
Abuse of intellectual property rights in competition law can occur when those rights 
are leveraged into markets to which the intellectual property rights do not extend,73 or the 
gaining of collateral advantages when licensing or assigning intellectual property rights. 74 
There are several types of conduct that are an abuse of market power, or that could 
competition on the market for weekly television magazines and therefore occupied a dominant position: 
above n 38, 542, para 47. 
71 Philip Tucker above n 28, 89. 
72 Queensland Wire above n 52. 
73 Philip Tucker above n 28, 82. Kamal Puri above n 19, 415. 
74 Kamal Puri above n 19, 415. 
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potentially be.75 These include refu di to license, tying, grantbacks, patent pooling and 
cross licensing. Many of the practices relate to licensing of intellectual property rights.76 
The following ections analyse what sort of conduct intellectual property rights owners 
could undertake that might be considered to be taking advantage of a substantial degree of 
market power. 
1 Tying 
Tying is short hand for the conduct of refusing to supply good or services protected 
by intellectual property rights unless the licensor also agrees to purchase other goods or 
services not so protected.77 Tying can be used to foreclose secondary markets.78 This could 
75 Vertical restraints are of less concern than horizontal restraints. There is more concern where licensee and 
licensor are actual or potential competitor : OECD above n 18, 23; Massimilliano Gangi above n 2, 359. 
Vertical arrangements are often viewed as tools to co-ordinate the incentive of downstream licensees with 
the interests of upstream licensors, so as to reduce transaction costs. opportunistic behaviour or free riding by 
upstream or downstream firms: Massimilliano Gangi above n 2, 359. 
76 The specific exemption for licensing is s 45, and an analysis of this section follows. ote that s 45 does not 
exempt licenses from s 36, so even if a licen e benefit from the exemption in s 45, that conduct can still be 
examined under s 36. 
77 The test for tying was set out in the United States case Norr hem Pac. Ry. v United States ( 1956) 356 U.S. 
1, 5 - 6. The Court stated that a tying arrangement is illegal per se if three condition are met: (I) there must 
be two distinct or separate products such that the purcha e of one product (tying product) is conditioned upon 
the purchase of another product (tied product), and the tied product must be one that is purchasable separate 
from the tying product; (2) the seller must have sufficient market power over the tying product to restrain 
appreciably free competition in the market for the tied product: and (3) the tying product must affect not an 
insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied product. 
78 If tying forecloses secondary markets, it could naturally restrict entry of competitor to that market, prevent 
others from engaging in competitive conduct in that market or eliminate a person from that market. However, 
the writer acknowledges that it is the purpose of the action, not the effect of the action that is the 
consideration under s 36(2)(a) to (c): Apple Fields Ltd v NZ Apple and Pear Marketing Board ( 1993) 7 
PRNZ 184, 189. Note also that the Patents Act 1953 has a provision aimed at general anti competitive 
conduct similar to tying by patentees, namely s 66. Section 66 makes void contracts that require the 
purchaser, lessee or licensee to acquire articles that are not subject to the patentee's patent (s 66( I )(a)) or 
prohibit the purchaser, lessee or licensee from using articles or patented processe that do not belong to the 
patentee (s 66(1)(b)). Section 66 allows for freedom of contract outside the parameters of s 66(1). Under s 
66(3)(a), contracts are not void under s 66 if at the time of making the contract the vendor, lessor or licensor 
was willing to sell or lease the article or grant a licen e to use or work the article or proce s to the purchaser, 
lessee or licensee, on reasonable terms as set out in the contract and without any of the conditions set out ins 
66( I). Under s 66(3)(b) contracts are not void if the purchaser, lessee or licensee, under the terms of the 
contract, is entitled to relieve him or herself of liability to observe the condition on 3 months notice, and 
compensation a may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Minister. Note that contracts are made 
void ifs 66 is satisfied and there is no ability to seek damages. ote also that there is no requirement that the 
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be achieved where the licensor holds considerable market power in the tying product and 
has the ability to extend its market power in the tied product. 79 
Eastman Kodak Co. v Image Technical Services Inc80 (Eastman Kodak) involved the 
service and spare parts of Eastman Kodak's photocopy machines. The service and spare 
parts markets were secondary markets to the photocopy machines themselves which were 
the subject of intellectual property rights. At first instance, Eastman Kodak gained 
summary judgment on the basis that the secondary market did not constitute a "market" for 
the purposes of competition Jaw. The majority of the United States Supreme Court 
however found that the possibility of the existence of such a market, was sufficient to deny 
summary judgment. 
Taking the example of Eastman Kodak, and assuming that Eastman Kodak had a 
substantial degree of power in the photocopier market; the photocopiers could embody all 
or some of patents, trade marks, design and copyri ght. If Ea tman Kodak made a 
condition of supply of their photocopiers, agreement to also purchase paper and toner from 
Eastman Kodak, not subject to any intellectual property ri ghts, from them, thi could 
amount to an abuse. 
Through tying, a firm with market power in the market for the tying good may 
acquire market power for the tied good, forcing the exit or over time preventing entry of 
suppliers of the tied good.81 If the ori ginal tying good was not ubject to an intellectual 
property right, others would be free to manufacture the good, and it would be unlikely the 
intellectual property rights owner could force a licensor to accept such terms. Eastman 
Kodak may over time be able to achieve a degree of market power in the secondary market 
of paper and toner through tying. 
conduct be anti competiti ve (takin g advantage of a substanti al degree of market power) as there is in the 
Commerce Act 1986. Therefore no inquiries into market power or the like would be nece sary. 
79 Massimilliano Gangi above n 2,367. 
80 Eastman Kodak Co. v Image Technical Serl'ices Inc ( 1992) 11 9 L Ed 2d 265. 
81 
OECD above n 18, 17 . 
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The OECD though has questioned the extent to which an intellectual property rights 
owner could leverage their market power by tying. They do so by linking the ability to 
leverage market power in an intellectual property good or service, to demand. Where tying 
is a condition of licensing, this could reduce consumption as consumers turn to substitute 
products. Consumers may be willing to pay a premium for the advantages of the latest 
technology, but there will always be a point where consumers will convert to alternative 
technologies. 82 In the Eastman Kodak example given, even if Eastman Kodak had the best 
available technology, consumers may seek alternative technology, rather than purchase the 
tied product as well as the intellectual property good or service.83 
In Morton Salt Co v G.S. Suppiger Co. 84 the intellectual property rights owner held a 
patent in a machine which used salt. The patent owner wanted licensees to use only its 
subsidiary's salt. This was found to be tying and anti competitive. 
2 Grant backs 
Grantback is a term that refers to a licensing agreement where the licensee is 
required to "grantback" any improvements on the patent to the licensor. Patents owner 
may wish to license for a grantback of improvements; otherwi se he or she faces the ri sk 
that the licensee will have the ability to patent improvements on the patent. The licensor 
may be surpassed or blocked by the licensee, the very person or firm it gave insights into 
its patent to. 
82 OECD above n 18, 18. 
83 There may be valid reasons why a li censor may tie products. A li censor may ti c protected products to other 
products that affect the operati on of the protected process. Use of other inferior quality products could affect 
the performance of the protected products, and thus the reputati on of the licensor. Using the Eas tman Kodak 
example again , Eastman Kodak may ti e paper and toner to the suppl y of photocopiers to ensure the be t 
operation of the photocopiers, thus preserving any reputati on fo r quality. 
84 Morton Salt Co v C.S. Suppiger Co. ( 1942) 3 14 US 488. 
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Grantback clauses are consideied to be a collateral advantage to licensing the 
intellectual property and anti competitive.85 Such conduct could fall foul of section 36 of 
the Act. 
3 Post-term of intellectual property protection agreements 
Provisions of intellectual property rights agreements that prevent a licensee from 
exploiting the intellectual property beyond the term of the intellectual property may be an 
abuse. This is clearly going beyond the scope of the intellectual property protection 
granted.86 
4 Refusal to license 
A refusal to license may in some cases entail elimination or substantial reduction of 
competition to the detriment of consumers in the short term and the long term. 87 It is ea y 
to see how a refusal to license could, depending on the availability of substitutes, re trict 
entry into a market, prevent or deter a person from engaging in competitive conduct in a 
market, or eliminate a person from a market. 88 If there are not sub titutes available and an 
intellectual property rights owner refuses to license, then it may be impossible to compete 
in the defined market. However, an intellectual property rights owner may not have one of 
those purposes, and may be merely exerci ing their exclusive rights. Furthermore, the 
intellectual property rights owner may be justified in restricting competition to some extent 
as part of the reward for research, development, innovation or creativity. In the European 
85 The United Kingdom Guidelines set out that any provision in an intellectual property right license which 
requires a licensee to grant back to the licensor any improvements may infringe the Competition Act 1998: 
Office of Fair Trading above n 18, I I. Grant backs are said to be likely to infringe Chapter I of the 
Competition Act 1998 the part of the Competition Act 1998 dealing with anti competitive conduct. 
86 In the United States case of Brulorre v Thvs Co. ( 1964) 379 U.S. 29, 30, 33 it wa found to be a misuse of 
the patent to charge royalties on a patent that had expired. 
87 Oscar Bronner above n 46, para 61 . 
88 See above under footnote 78 for an explanation of purpose and effect under the Act. 
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Court of Justice, Advocate-General ;acobs (Jacobs) sets the backdrop for the concerns 
involved in refusal to license cases: 89 
In assessing such conflicting interests particular care is required where the goods or services 
or facilities to which access is demanded represent the fruit of substantial investment. That 
may be true in particular in relation to refusal to license intellectual property rights. Where 
such exclusive rights are granted for a limited period, that in itself involves a balancing of the 
interest in free competition with that of providing an incentive for research and development 
and for creativity. It is therefore with good reason that the Court has held that the refusal to 
license does not of itself, in the absence of other factors, constitute an abuse.90 
( a) Volvo 
In Volvo the European Court of Justice found that the designs used in the cars were 
Volvo's intellectual property, and this extended to the secondary market of spare parts for 
Volvos. The European Court of Justice held: 91 
It must also be emphasised that the right of the proprietor of a protected design to prevent 
third parties from manufacturing and selling or importing, without its consent, products 
incorporating the design constitutes the very subject-matter of his exclusive right. It follows 
that an obligation imposed upon the proprietor of a protected design to grant to third parties, 
even in return for a reasonable royalty, a license for the supply of products incorporating the 
design would lead to the proprietor thereof being deprived of the substance of his exclusive 
right, and that a refusal to grant such a license cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position. 
Volvo demonstrates that exclusive rights are the very heart of intellectual property rights 
and that in the absence of exceptional circumstances, intellectual property rights owners 
should not be forced to supply their goods or services. 
89 Oscar Bronner above n 46, para 62, per Advocate-General Jacobs. 
90 Volvo above n 58. 
91 Volvo above n 58, para 8. 
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(b) Magill 
The European Court of Justice in Radio Telefis Eireann v European Commission92 
(Magill) found for the first time a refusal to license intellectual property rights to be an 
abuse of a dominant position. "Exceptional circumstance " were found justifying the 
f . d" 93 rn rng. 
The conduct objected to was the appellant's reliance on copyright conferred by 
national legislation so as to prevent Magill, or any other undertaking, from publishing on a 
weekly basis television listings, together with commentaries and pictures obtained 
independently of the appellants.94 
The Court in Magill found that the refusal to supply on the ba is of national 
copyright law, prevented the appearance of a new product for which there was potential 
demand and no actual or potential substitute.95 There was found to be no ju tification for 
the refusal either in the activity of televi sion broadcasting or in that of publishing television 
magazines. The companies had excluded all potential competitors from the secondary 
market of weekly television guides .96 
92 Magill above n 37. 
93 In Volvo above n 58, 6236 para 9, it was set out th at in "excepti onal circumstances" refu sing to li cense 
intellectual property ri ghts could amount to abuse of a dominant pos ition. Those circum tances were aid to 
be when spare parts were arbitrarily refu ed to repairers, excessive prices were being charged or when the 
spare parts were no longer being made when there remained a large number of vehicles of that model on the 
road. Magill above n 37, was the first case to find the refusal an abuse. 
94 Magill above n 37, 542, para 51 . 
95 Magill above n 37,543, para 54. 
96 Magill above n 37,543, para 56. 
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It is questionable whether in Magill a comprehensive television guide constitutes a 
new product. It is arguable that the comprehensive television guide is not a new product 
and therefore would compete with the broadcasting companies' listings. The Advocate-
General in Magill says that it is only an abuse of a dominant position to prevent the 
emergence of a product that does not compete with his or her product.97 
It is also arguable that the comprehensive weekly television guide basically meets the 
same consumer needs as does the individual listings, therefore there is no new product for 
Article 86 to apply to. A comprehensive weekly television guide would be more 
convenient, but consumers are still able to buy all three television listings separately. 
Therefore potential substitutes exist. 
(c) Oscar Bronner 
The more recent decision of the European Court of Justice Oscar Bronner GmbH 
and others v European Commission98 (Oscar Bronn.er) concerned the publishing of daily 
newspapers. The case did not concern intellectual property rights in the newspapers, but 
access to a nation-wide home delivery service for daily newspapers. The appellants, Oscar 
Bronner, claimed Mediaprint Group had abused its market power in the area of new paper 
distribution with a view to eliminating competition on the connected newspaper market. 
The Court in Oscar Bronner appears to read down Magill and question the 
appropriateness of requiring intellectual property rights owners to license their goods or 
services. Jacobs states that "[t]he ruling in Magill can in my view be explained by the 
special circumstances of that case which swung the balance in favour of an obligation to 
Jicense".99 
97 Magill above n 37, para 96 (Opinion). 
98 Oscar Bronner above n 46. 
99 Oscar Bronner above n 46, para 63. 
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This seems to be aying that Magill turned on its facts, and Magill is not precedent for 
intellectual property rights owners being forced to supply good or services. Jacobs finds 
three reasons why the facts in Magill are exceptional. 100 He finds that I) the existing 
television listings were inadequate, so the exercise of the copyright prevented the 
appearance of a new product on the market, 2) the provision of copyright was protection 
for programme listings was difficult to justify in terms of rewarding or providing an 
inventive for creative effort, and 3) the life of the programme guides was short, so the 
copyright protection provided a permanent banier to the entry of a new product on the 
market. 
Jacobs states that generally intellectual property rights will only restrict competition 
for a limited period, but there may be instances where there is a permanent exclusion of 
competition on a related market. Competition may only be achieved in those instances by 
requiring the competitor to supply the product. He says that if the competitor is forced to 
supply, he or she must be fully compensated by allowing him or her to allocate an 
appropriate proportion of its investment costs to the supply and to make an appropriate 
return on its investment having regard to the level of risk involved. 101 
Jacobs' statements seem to indicate a reluctance to force intellectual property ri ghts 
owners to supply their goods or services. The Court found no obligation on Mediaprint to 
allow Bronner access to its nation-wide home delivery network. 
100 Oscar Bronner above n 46, para 63. 
101 Oscar Bronner above n 46, para 64 per Advocate-General Jacobs . 
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(d) lngman 
Similar warnings are also echoed in the decision of Philips Electronics NV v lngman 
Ltd1°2 (Ingman) which considered the allegation of abuse of a dominant position as a 
defence to patent infringement. 103 Laddie J took a narrow interpretation of Magill and 
found that if firms wanted to rely on Magill to resist the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, then the exceptional circumstances must be explicitly pleaded to take the 
case outside the principles of Volvo. 10
4 He went on to hold that it is not an abuse of a 
dominant position to refuse to license an intellectual property right, even on reasonable 
terms, nor on grounds which are objectively unreasonable. 105 
Laddie J in Ingman also articulates that he does not consider all intellectual property 
rights to be equal. 106 For this reason he does not consider that Magill can be applied by 
analogy to a patent case. This is a further limitation on the potential applicability of Magill 
to intellectual property rights. 
102 Philips Electronics NV v lngman Ltd and another [ 1999] 26 FSR l I 2 (CD) (lngman). 
103 In that case Philips held patents for compact discs. Because of international standardisation of practice, it 
was difficult to manufacture a compact disc that did not infringe Philips' patents. Philips offered to license 
the patent to Ingman. Ingman refused and made the compact discs regardless. Philip ubsequently sued for 
patent infringement in the United Kingdom. Ingman alleged the patent proceedings were an abuse of a 
dominant position under Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 
104 Laddie J also made some interesting obiter comments that the different forms of intellectual property must 
be treated differently for the purposes of Article 86. Laddie J also emphasised the importance of the 
monopoly rights in patents as incentives to research and development. 
105 Ing man above n I 02, I 27, para 40 per Laddie J. 
106 Laddie J states that "[t]hey last for di ffercnt period in respect of different types of subject matter. They 
are infringed by different types of activity. They arc subject to different types of defences or exceptions.": 
Ing man above n I 02, 134 - I 35, para 66 per Laddie J. 
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( e) Unmeritorious intellectual property 
Philip Tucker states that competition law must intervene where intellectual property 
rights in a market are used in a manner that exceeds what is nece sary to protect and 
reward the owner.
107 However, this would involve examining the value or merit of the 
intellectual property right and subsequently what reward i deserved. One commentator 
argued that the result in Magill is not surprising, given the copyright in question. 108 It 
should be assumed that intellectual property law has struck the balance between reward 
and monopoly. Competition law should not examine or consider the merit of the 
intellectual property right. Competition law should examine whether the owner has taken 
advantage of market power in exercising those rights. 
The European Court of Justice in Magill stated that the conditions and procedures for 
granting protection of an intellectual property right is a matter for national rules.
109 Yet the 
European Court of Justice did seem swayed by the lack of merit in the copyright by calling 
the listings "basic information". 110 Advocate-General Gulmann 111 in Magill considers that 
the actual grounds for applying Article 86 must be that the programme listings were not 
d d · · · 112 regar e as mentrng protectrnn. 
107 Philip Tucker above n 28, 82. Kamal Puri above n 19,415. 
108 Valentine Korah Compulso,~y Licenses and Incentives to Invest in Innovation and Compulsory Licenses 
(OECD, Paris, l 998) <www.oecd.org/daf/clp/roundtables/IPR-GD.PDF> (last acces ed 22 April 2002) 369. 
109 Magill above n 37, 542, para 49. 
11 0 Magill above n 37, 543, para 57 (Judgment). 
111 The Advocate-General's Opinion is not binding on the European Court of Justice, but at the time it was 
issued it was con idered to be indicative of the decision likely to be taken by the European Court of Justice: 
Sasha Haines "Copyright Takes The Dominant Position: The Advocate General's Opinion In Magill" [ 1994] 
EIPR 16(9) 401, 401. The Opinion was also de cribed as being "widely greeted with relief and enthusiasm 
because of its broadly pro-copyright approach'" by the ame author. 
112 Magill above n 37, para 122 (Opinion). 
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If any court has difficulty accepting the scope of the copyright, or indeed any other 
intellectual property right, competition law is not the correct method of remedying any 
perceived defect. The correct course is for the national legislature to turn their minds to the 
perceived defects of intellectual property law. 113 
The works in question m Magill enjoyed copyright protection m the United 
Kingdom. 114 However, it could be argued that the copyright works were merely 
information. Normally there is no copyright protection available for information. 115 
Copyright though is not concerned with the merit or excellence of the work, merely that it 
is original, so it is not wholly inappropriate that the works were protected by copyright in 
the United Kingdom. 116 
In Magill even though the television listings were mere information, the listings were 
protected by copyright as original works and subject to exclusive rights. The exclusive 
right means the right to exclude. If others could copy, the right would not be exclusive. 117 
113 One commentator states that competition law hould not be used to "trim" intellectual property rights: 
Christopher Stothers above n 41, 92. 
114 These enjoyed protection under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) as literary works and 
compilations. 
115 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott and Mary Viloria The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs 2ed, Vol. 
(Butterworths, London, 1995) 61. 
116 The work does not have to be "ingenious, inventive or imaginative" it suffices that the work is original in 
the sense that it originates form the author, that is, its creation involved him in the expenditure of a 
substantial amount of independent skill or Jabour. There may be copyright in a verse of four lines (Kipling v 
Genatosan Ltd Macg Cop Gas ( 1917-23) 203), or in a directory compiled by walking the streets of London 
and asking householders to supply their names (Kelly v Morris (1866) LR I Eq 697), or betting coupons 
(Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd I (1964) WLR 273): Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott and 
Mary Vitoria above n I 15, 4. Copyright is said to protect "the highest forms of intellectual and artistic 
endeavour and yet the most banal industrial or engineering drawings": Andrew Brown and Anthony Grant 
The Law of Intellectual Property in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, I 989) 223. However, after the 
issue of the Court of First Instance's decision and before the European Court of Justice heard the case, the 
Broadcasting Act I 990 was amended on I March 1991, to create compulsory licensing of television listings 
(see section 176 of the United Kingdom Broadcasting Act I 990). Presumably to remedy the perceived 
defects of copyright Jaw. 
117 Hugh Laddie, Peter Prescott and Mary Vitoria above n 115, 80. 
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By refusing to supply the copyright work, the appellants were arguably merely exercising 
their exclusive rights. 118 
The Court of First Instance, upheld by the European Court of Justice, considered that 
preventing the appearance of a new product, for which there was potential demand, 
excluding competition from that market, "solely in order to secure the applicant's 
monopoly": 119 
- clearly goes beyond what is necessary to fulfil the essential function of the copyright as 
permitted in Community law. 
Copyright is essentially a monopoly. 120 If copyright gives exclusive rights, and the 
appellants exercised those exclusive rights, by refusing to license, how is that going 
beyond the exclusive right? 121 
118 This is what the appellants argued in this case, that the result is a natural consequence of copyright. The 
copyright owner of course deprives anybody else from making a product from the copyright material. Magill 
above n 37, 541, para 42 (Judgment). The Advocate General in his Opinion in Magill agreed with this view, 
Advocate General Gulmann states that "copyright laws give copyright owner the right to restrict 
competition" Magill above n 37, para 11 per Advocate-General Gulmann (Opinion). 
119 Independent Television Publication Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [ I 991] 2 CEC 174, 
35, 36 (emphasis added). 
12° Copyright confers the power to exclude with respect to the specific work in question: USDOJFfC above n 
24, 4. Copyright has been described as a monopoly by the Privy Council in Green v Broadcasting 
Corporation of New Zealand above n 60, 19. One commentator argues that copyright is not a monopoly, just 
a right to exclude others, because the right is essentially negative, it prevents others from copying you, but if 
there was independent creation of two identical works, there would be no infringement of the other: Skone 
James, Mummery, James and Garnett Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (Sweet and Maxwell, 
London, I 991) I. supported by Corelli v Cray ( 1913) 29 TLR 570 and British Leyland Motor Corporation v 
Armstrong Patents Co Ltd [ 1986] RPC 279, 361. 
121 The appellants argued that they did no more than refuse to license their exclu ive right, which they were 
entitled to do: Magill above n 37, 541 , para 41 (Judgment). Advocate-General Gulmann states that as a 
corollary to an exclusive right is the right to refu e licenses. Accordingly, the right to refuse licenses forms 
part of the specific subject matter of copyright. Advocate-General Gulmann states that this view is supported 
by Volvo above n 58, 6260, para 8. Sec Magill above n 37, para 38, per Advocate-General Gulmann 
(Opinion). 
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In terms of competition law, the decision in Magill may be viewed as positive if it 
resulted in a new product at a cheaper price. However, the result may not be viewed so 
positively for intellectual property rights. The Advocate-General in Magill, emphasises the 
importance of copyright. 122 He states that copyright is "of fundamental importance both for 
the owner of the right and for society" .123 Copyright repre ents an incentive for the 
investment of intellectual and economic resources. 124 Forcing a copyright owner to supply 
their copyrighted works to third parties may arguably reduce the incentive to invest in 
intellectual and economic resources. 125 This may be the effect Magill achieves. 
In relation to the Commerce Act it has been stated that there is a danger that the Act 
may be used as a backdoor way for other companies to acce s a private intellectual 
property right for free. 126 This is said to have the potential to be economically darnaging.
127 
It could be argued that Magill used competition law as a backdoor way of accessing 
intellectual property rights. 
122 He states that the balance must be in favo ur of inte ll ectual property ri ghts: Magill above n 37 para 80, per 
Advocate-General Gulmann (Opinion). 
123 Magill above n 37, para 11 , per Ad vocate-General Gulmann (Opinion). He goes onto state, at para 12, that 
copyri ght laws have duly balanced the vari ous interes ts that must be protected by society, including 
protecting the interests of the copyright o wner and on the other hand undi storted competiti on. 
124 CNL - SUCAL NV (SA ) v HAG CF AC (Case C- / 0 1/89) [1990] ECR I - 37 11 , 3758, para 13. 
125 To apply competiti on law durin g the peri od of inte ll eciual property protecti on by compul sory li censing is 
said to "annul the grant of the monopoly ri ght' ' and remove a po licy too l whi ch encourages producti on o f 
intellectual property: Chri stopher Stothers above n 4 1, 9 1. 
126 Alan Boll ard Comment on the Commerce Act 1986 Rei•iew ( ZIER, Wellington, 1989) 7 in Ministry of 
Commerce Review of th e Commerce Act 1986 (Mini stry of Commerce, Competiti on Po li cy and Business 
Law Divi sion, Wellington, 1989). 
127 Alan Bollard above n 126, 7 . Presumabl y economica ll y damaging to the inte ll ectual property ri ghts 
owner, and to the economy as a who le as the incenti ve to create or innovate decreases. 
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Laddie Jin Ingman also emphasise the importance of the non- interference with the 
exclusive right for the promotion of re earch and development. He states that it is the hope 
and promise financial reward which is designed to justify the risk involved in investing in 
research and development. 128 
(f) IMS Health 
For the second time only in history, the European Court of Ju tice in IMS Health Inc 
v Commission of the European Communities 129 (IMS Health) has found a refusal to supply 
intellectual property to be an abuse of a dominant position. IMS Health collected and sold 
data on pharmaceutical sales and prescriptions using a copyrighted system that divided the 
German market into 1 860 "bricks". This copyrighted system became an industry standard. 
As in Magill, the appellant successfully brought copyright actions against competitors 
using the copyright material. 
The Court found that IMS Health had abused its dominant position in the 
pharmaceutical sales data market by refusing to license the system. It was not 
economically viable for competitors, or potential competitors, to buy sales data that was 
formatted in a non-compatible structure. 
There were found to be exceptional circumstances, as in Magill, 130 warranting the 
intervention with the intellectual property right. The exceptional circumstances in this case 
128 Ing man above n l 02, 124 - 125 , para 34, per Laddie J. 
129 IMS Health above n 62. 
130 The European Court of Justice found that the facts of the ea e met the exceptional circumstances 
summarised in Oscar Bronner for refusal to licen e to constitute an abuse of a dominant position. The 
circumstances are that the refusal is, I) likely to eliminate all competition on the downstream market; 2) 
incapable of objective justification; and 3) the material or work is indispensable to business in a downstream 
market, in that there i no potential or actual substitute. There are other similarities between Magill and IMS 
Health. In both cases the copyright was not highly creative. Also there was no way in either instance to 
reproduce the material without infringing the copyright. Therefore it seems there was a link made between 
the merit of the intellectual property right and the finding of abuse in competition law. 
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were said to be that there were no actual or potential substitutes, there was no justification 
for the refusal and all competition in Germany would be eliminated. 
( g) Refusals to license in the United States 
In the United States an intellectual property rights owner is said to have an absolute 
right to acquire rights, to refuse to use the rights and to refuse to license others. 131 This is 
said to be true even where the effect of the intellectual property right is to give monopoly 
power. 
132 And further, that if an intellectual property rights owner was forced to licen e the 
rights, the exclusive rights would be illusory, the value of the right declines and the market 
for rights cannot function. 133 
Some time ago in 1908, in Continental Paper Bag Co. v Eastern Paper Bag Co. 134 a 
patent owner brought an action for infringement. The owner had never used or licensed the 
patent. In relation to not licensing the patent, the Court said: 135 
As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from the use of the new patent, we 
answer that such exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the right 
conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or not to use it, 
without question of motive. 
131 Continental Paper Bag Co. v Eastern Paper Bag Co. ( 1908) 210 U.S. 405, 426 - 430 and United States v 
United States Shoe Machinery Co. 247 U.S. 32, 57 - 58 (1918): Standard Oil v United States 283 U.S. 163, 
179 ( 1931) all cited in John W. Schlicher Licensing l11tellectual Property: Legal, Business and Market 
Dynamics (Wiley, New York, 1996) 177. The USDOJFTC "Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property" state that market power acquired by intellectual property right owners does not impose 
an obligation to license the use of that property to others, see USDOJFTC above n 24, 4. The Guidelines go 
on to explain that market power that is illegally acquired or maintained , or, even if lawfully acquired and 
maintained, would be relevant to the ability of an intellectual property right owner to harm competition 
through unreasonable conduct in connection with such property. 
132 United States v E./. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1953) 118 F. Supp. 41,212 - 214 (D . Del.). See al o 
Intergraph Corp v Intel Corp ( 1999) 195 F 3d 1346, 1362 (Fed Cir) where it wa tated that "market power 
does not impose on the intellectual property right owner an obligation to license the use of that property to 
others". 
133 John W. Schlicher above n 131 , 177. 
134 Continental Paper Bag Co. v Eastern Paper Bag Co. above n 131. 
135 Continental Paper Bag Co. v Eastern Paper Bag Co. above n 131 , 429. 
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In a more recent case, Independent Service Organi:::.ations Antitrust Litigation, 136 
Xerox stopped supplying patented parts and replacement parts and software to a group of 
independent service organisations. This wa challenged as an antitrust violation. The 
Federal Circuit observed that the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention free from liability under 
antitrust law. 137 
It appears rare then that a refusal to license intellectual property rights in the United 
States would be an antitrust violation. The general approach outlined above in the United 
States is to be commended and as the Act is based on the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) 
which is in turn based on the Sherman Act 1890, is one that New Zealand may well follow. 
5 Cross-licensing 
Cross-licensing can be used by direct competitors who are holders of substitutable 
technology to set prices. 138 
In Magill the broadcasters did not cross-license the televi sion li stings to each 
other. 139 If they had done so, they could have produced a comprehensive televi sion guide 
between them. Or at least one that covered all of their televi ion li stings. The result could 
have been different if in Magill the broadcasters had cross-licensed to each other but 
136 Independent Service Organisations Antitrust Litigation (2000) 203 F. 3d 1322 (Fed. Circ.) cert. Denied, 
CSU, L.L.C. v Xerox Corp (200 1) 121 (S. Ct). 
137 Independent Service Organisations Antitrust Litigation above n 136, 1327. That was onl y in the absence 
of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in the PTO [United States Patent and Trade Mark Office] , or sham 
litigation . The Court in Independent Service Organisations Antitrust Litigation (2000) 203 F. 3d 1322 (Fed. 
Circ.) cert. denied, CSU, L.L.C. v Xerox Corp (200 1) 12 1 (S. Ct.) 1328, went further and referred to 
copyright: 
[T]he owner of the copyri ght, if (it] pleases. may refrain from vending or li censing the 
content [it elf] with simply exercising the right to excl ud e others from u ing [its] property. 
138 Massimilliano Gangi above n 2, 359. 
139 There was no di scuss ion of cross li censing in the decision of the European Court of Ju ti ce nor in the 
Opinion of the Advocate-General. 
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refused to supply to other firms. No doubt the refusal would be arbitrary and arguably only 
for the purpose of preventing competitors from producing products that competed with 
their own. Magill would still be in the same position, unable to access the television 
listings and compete on the comprehensive television guide market. 140 However, it would 
take away one of the European Court of Justice's main grounds for finding abuse of a 
domjnant position: that the broadcasters prevented the appearance of a new product for 
which there was potential demand. If the broadcasters produced a comprehensive 
television guide, they may be stifling competition in the market for comprehensive 
television guides, but there is no prevention of the appearance of a new product. 
6 Compulsory licenses 
The Patents Act 1953 has a compulsory licensing provision.
141 This provision has 
been described as being aimed at "abuse of monopoly" 142 and abuse of patent rights. 143 
This section is concerned with the public at large, rather than with the patentee and/or the 
proposed licensee.
144 The Designs Act 1953 also has a compulsory licensing provision. 145 
14° Keeping in mind however, that the purpose of competition law is to protect the interests of consumers, not 
the interests of competitors. Consumers may be in a better position because they are now able to buy all the 
television guides in one publication, however, if there is no competition for that product, then consumers may 
be being charged monopoly prices. 
141 
Under the Patents Act 1953, s 46, any person intere ted may apply to the Court for the grant of a license 
under the patent under the grounds set out in s 46(2) any time after the expiration of 3 years from the date of 
sealing the patent or 4 years from the date of the patent, whichever is the latest. The grounds in s 46(2) are 
that a market for the patented invention is not being supplied, or not being supplied on reasonable terms in 
New Zealand. Section 46(3) to (8) set out the other circumstances that must be met for a compulsory license 
to be granted for a patent. 
142 F Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v WM Bamford & Co Ltd (No 2) [ 1976] I NZLR 371, 373 (SC) per 
Haslam J. 
143 G/a.xo Group Ltd v Commissioner of Patents [ 1991 J 3 NZLR 179, 183 (CA) per Cooke P. 
144 F Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v WM Bamford & Co Ltd (No 2) above n 142,373, per Haslam J. It has 
been said that "the grounds enumerated in s 46(2) envisage continuou regard for the interests of the public" 
and "the needs of the consumer in New Zealand.": F Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v WM Bamford & Co 
Ltd (No 2) above n 142, 374, per Haslam J. This concern for consumers is tempered bys 48 of the Patents 
Act 1953 which tales that the powers of the Court on application of s 46, must be exercised with a view to 
securing that the inventor or other per on beneficially entitled to a patent shall receive reasonable 
remuneration having regard to the nature of the invention. 
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An "interested person" may choose to use patents or designs legislation, to obtain a license 
to use one of the rights, rather than relying on the grant of a compulsory license as a result 
of a finding of a breach of section 36 of the Act. 146 
In Magill the Advocate-General states that compulsory licenses in the field of 
copyright are virtually unheard of. 147 His reasons are that copyright laws of member states 
have duly balanced the various interests that must be protected; where copyright law 
confers an exclusive right, that must be respected by competition law. 
In Ingman, Laddie J says that if patentees are obliged to grant licenses on fair and 
reasonable terms, it will have a serious impact on the patent system. 148 Not only would the 
patentee not be able to decline licenses at all but his ability to benefit financially from 
having taken the research and development risk would be seriously compromised: 149 
A license negotiated between a patentee and a potential licensee in circumstances where the 
patentee can decline to grant a licen e at all is likely to be on very different terms to one 
negotiated in circumstances where the licensee knows that he is entitled to a license and the 
court or some other third party can be called on to settle reasonable terms. 
Laddie J in Ingman goes on to state that compulsory licenses would destroy the very 
subject matter of the exclusive right. It i clear in Volvo that exclusivity is the very heart of 
intellectual property rights. 150 It is arguable that compulsory licenses defeat the purpose of 
145 The Designs Act 1953, s 14, allows for any interested person to apply to the Commi sioner for the grant 
of a compulsory license of the design on the grounds that the design is not applied in New Zealand by any 
industrial process or means to the article to an extent as is reasonable in the circumstance of the ea e, any 
time after a design has been registered . 
146 This would be a result of as a result of establishing a patent or design owner was taking advantage of a 
substantial degree of power in a market under the Act, and the court awarding a compulsory license. 
147 Magill above n 37, para 13 (Opinion). 
148 Ingma11 above n I 02, I 24 - I 25, para 34. 
149 Ingma11 above n I 02, I 24 - I 25, para 34, per Laddie J. 
150 Ingma11 above n I 02, 127, para 40, per Laddie J. 
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intellectual property rights. A compulsory license by way of competition law takes away 
the exclusive right granted by intellectual property law. 
On the other hand, if the intellectual property rights are subject to a compulsory 
license and the owner receives reasonable royalties, then arguably there has been no loss. 
He or she has been rewarded for the research and/or development expended. It is only the 
principle that has been offended, that intellectual property rights are exclusive and should 
remain that way. 
A distinction could be made between infringement of rights by counterfeiters or 
pirates, and a firm that wants to obtain the rights legitimately, in term of the goals of the 
intellectual property system. Harking back to the original goals of the intellectual property 
system, no person should be able to reap the rewards of another's efforts. Furthermore, 
intellectual property is easily duplicated and therefore exclusive rights are warranted. A 
refusal to license intellectual property may be taking the exclusive right further than i 
intended by the system that provides the protection. Essentially the system is designed to 
prevent free riding and reward the innovator/creator. By licensing the intellectual property 
there is no free riding and the intellectual property rights owner receives a reward in the 
form of royalties. So even though the right is not exclusive, the owner is in the position 
anticipated by the system; no person has copied the property without permission and the 
owner has been financially rewarded for his or her efforts. 
However, a balance must be truck between rewarding for past efforts and an 
incentive to do the same again in the future. When deciding what a reasonable royalty i , 
presumably it would have to be naturally high to include the reward for research and 
development and an incentive to create/innovate in the future. Arguably, if forced to 
relinquish the exclu ive right, an intellectual property rights owner may not be encouraged 
to engage in further research and development or innovation/creativity again, unless 
completely satisfied with the royalty as the reward. 
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VI SECTION 36(3) 
If an intellectual property rights owner was talcing advantage of a substantial degree 
of market power and was using it for one of the purposes set out in ection 36(2)(a) to (c), 
the intellectual property rights owner may be able to avoid scrutiny by reason only that he 
or she seeks to enforce a statutory intellectual property right. 
Section 36(3) is intended to provide an interface between competition law and the 
law relating to intellectual property by providing an exemption from competition law, 
business arrangements authorised under the various statutes relating to intellectual 
property. 151 The reason for the incorporation of section 36(3) is to protect owners of 
intellectual property rights who take legitimate actions to protect those rights.
152 One could 
ask whether such express exemptions are necessary given that they are specifically 
authorised by other statutes. 
A International Comparison: Are Specific Exclusions Necessary? 
It is worth noting that Australian competition legislation does not have the equivalent 
of section 36(3). The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) has the equivalent of section 45, but 
not the equivalent of the New Zealand section 36(3). Given that New Zealand competition 
legislation is heavily based on the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), thi s is perhaps an odd 
departure. One commentator suggests that despite Australia not showing "the same 
abundance of caution" in providing intellectual property exclusions, it is reasonable to 
expect that a similar approach to contravention of section 36 of the Act and section 46 of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) will be taken.
153 
15 1 Memorandum for Cabinet Poli cy Committee ··Rev iew of the Commerce Act 1986" (Ministry of 
Commerce, Competiti on Poli cy and Business Law Di vision, Wellington, August 1989) 3. 
152 Brooker 's Gault on Commercial Law above n 42, CA36.33, 3 - 170. 
153 Brooker 's Gault on Commercial Law above n 42, 36.33 3- I 70(a) . 
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The United Kingdom does not have any specific exemptions for intellectual property 
under Chapter II of the Competition Act 1998 in relation to abuse of a dominant 
· · 154 pos1t10n . 
In the Canadian Bureau of Competition draft guidelines of treatment of intellectual 
property under its Competition Act, the competition analy is is aid to apply to conduct 
involving intellectual property as to other forms of property. 155 It acknowledges that 
intellectual property has unique characteri stics, but considers standard competition analysis 
appropriate. 
The European Union does not have any intellectual property specific exclu ions in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, however a number of "Group Exemptions" exist. These Group 
Exemptions exempt categories of conduct deemed to be in the public interest. 
Arrangements that meet all the conditions set out, are automatically exempted. There are 
eight Group Exemptions, including regulation of technology transfer agreements, and al so 
research and development and exploitation of the results.
156 Thi s approach has been 
described as "highly prescriptive".157 
154 There are certain intell ectual property exclusions for verti cal agreements under Chapter I o f the 
Competition Act 1998, the part of the Act that deals with contracts, arrangements and under landings. 
Agreements which include intellectual property ri ghts provision are likely to be excluded from the 
application of Chapter I of the Competiti on Act 1998 where the agreement operates at a different level of the 
production or di stribution chain, relates to the conditions of purchase, sale or resale, pro vided those provision 
do not constitute the primary object of the agreement and are related to use, sale or resale and express ly 
include assignment to the buyer or use by the buyer o f intell ectual property ri ghts. See Office of Fair Trading 
above n 18, 5 - 6. 
155 Canadian Bureau of Competiti on above n 24. In the majority of circumstances pertaining to intell ectual 
property will be deal with under the general prov isions of the Competition Act. It states that in the majority 
of cases the Bureau will only take enforcement acti on if the owner of an intell ectual property ri ght engage in 
conduct that is beyond the statutory and common law intellectual property ri ghts and the conduct is anti 
competitive. 
156 This essay does not explore those Group Exemptions further, but notes that they ex ist. 
157 Intellectual Property & Competiti on Rev iew Committee above n 37, 32. 
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In the United States there are .10t any intellectual property specific exclusions in the 
antitrust legislation. The United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission apply the same antitrust principles and analysis as they would for any other 
type of tangible or intangible property. 158 The United States Agencies note that authorities 
can take into account the specific characteristics of intellectual property, such as ease of 
misappropriation, when applying the relevant principles and conducting analyses. 
There is some merit in this approach. It seems that where a specific intellectual 
property right is given by statute, it would defeat the purpose of granting intellectual 
property protection, if that right were to be determined to be anti competitive under 
competition legislation. Furthermore, in New Zealand, the two areas of law do not exist in 
isolation. The relevant principles from each area of policy were considered at the time of 
drafting each piece of legislation, as Parliament included intellectual property exclusions in 
the Act. 
Perhaps then, given the obvious overlap, there is no need to have specific intellectual 
property exclusions, and the courts will consider the specific characteristics of intellectual 
property when conducting competition law analysis. This approach is arguably supported 
by one of the only cases in New Zealand to consider section 36(3), Telecom Corp of NZ 
Ltd v Clear Communication Ltd1 59 (Telecom v Clear). 
B Reasonable Exercise of Statutory Rights as an Abuse in Australia 
Despite Australia not having an equivalent exemption to section 36(3) of the Act in 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), several Australian cases have considered the question 
of whether exercising legal rights under other statutes amounts to taking advantage of a 
substantial degree of power in a market. 
158 USDOJFfC above n 24, 3. 
159 Telecom Corp of NZ Ltd v Clear Comm1111icatio11s Ltd [ 1992) 3 NZLR 247; ( 1992) 4 TCLR 568 (HC) 
(Telecom v Clear). 
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In the case of Warman Intern.itional v Envirotech Australia Pty Ltd, 160 (Warman) 
Warman was said to have a substantial degree of power in the pumps parts market and was 
attempting to eliminate or damage a competitor by bringing copyright infringement and 
breach of confidence actions. The Court found that Warman were not seeking to take 
advantage of the market power but only to take advantage of the rights claimed in re pect 
of particular documents. 
In Australian Performing Rights Association Ltd v Ceridale Pty Ltd1 61 (Ceridale) the 
respondent ran a nightclub and relied on supply of music from the Australasian Performing 
Rights Association (APRA). APRA had a substantial degree of power in a market because 
it owned the right of public performance in nearly all pop music in Australia. APRA 
cancelled Ceridale's license for non-payment of fees. Ceridale claimed this breached 
section 46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) because APRA was using its substantial 
degree of power in a market for the purpose of preventing it from engaging in the 
competitive conduct in the nightclub market. 
The Federal Court found that APRA did not take advantage of their market power. 
162 
The Federal Court found that APRA ' purpo e in refusing to licen e, was only to prevent 
unauthorised use of its material and the integrity of its licensing system. 
163 The Federal 
Court expanded on the exercising of legal rights: 
164 
160 Warman Intern ational v Envirotech Australia P(v Ltd ( 1986) ATPR 40- 174 (FCA) (Warman). Au tra lia 
does not have a similar provision for intell ectual property ri ghts in the Trade Pract ices Act 1974 (Cth) a 
New Zealand does in s 36(3). 
161 Australasia Pe,forming Rights Association Ltd v Ceridale Pry Ltd ( 199 1) A TPR 4 1-074 (FCA) 
(Ce ridale). 
162 The Federal Court fo und that APRA were willing to grant a new licen e to Ceridale if a proper appli cation 
was lodged. According to the Federal Court, Ceridale never submitted a proper appli cation or the required 
fees. 
163 The Federal Court did not find that any of the pro cribed purposes were made ou t as APRA had no motive 
to prevent Ceridale from competing in the ni ghtclub market. 
164 Ceridale above n 161 , 52 029. 
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From time to time the question hc1s arisen whether the exercise in good faith of an extraneous 
legal right, by a corporation which has substantial market power, may be said to be a taking 
advantage of its power ... s 46 is only contravened if the relevant act of the corporation is 
undertaken for a purpose proscribed by sub-s (I) of s 46. 
In Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Kenman Developments Pty Ltd & Ors, 165 (Cadbury) 
Kenman argued that by bringing what was argued as untenable legal proceedings, 
166 
Cadbury had misused its market power. In the Federal Court, Olney J stated that: 167 
There may well be circumstances in which the unreasonable pursuit of a claimed legal right 
against a less powerful competitor by a corporation with a sub tantial market power could 
amount to taking advantage of that power but that case is not this case. 
Cadbury's conduct was not categorised as unreasonable. 
The Australian approach recognises that using legal right can constitute taking 
advantage of a substantial degree of power in a market, but only where the purpose 
proscribed, and not where the purpose is only to take advantage of a statutory right. 
C New Zealand Consideration of Section 36(3) and the Reasonable Exercise of 
Rights 
In Telecom v Clear, Telecom threatened to take legal action against Clear for 
infringing their copyright in toll charts published in telephone directories. Clear claimed 
that this threat was a contravention of section 36. The Judge considered that the conduct:
168 
165 Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Kenman Developmellfs Pry Ltd & Ors ( 1991 ) ATPR 41-116 (FCA) 
(Cadbury). 
166 The alleged conduct was misleading or deceptive conduct in adopting packaging s imilar to Cadbury's 
under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). 
167 Cadbury above n 165, 52 757, per Olney J. 
168 Telecom v Clear above n I 59, 576, per Smcllie J. 
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is expressly excluded by section l36(3)] from conduct proscribed in ection 36(2) in that the 
pursuit of copyright (or other intellectual property rights) is recogni ed as appropriate. 
In Telecom v Clear the Judge went on to consider the "test" set out by the Court of Appeal 
in Electricity Corp Ltd v Geotherm Energy Ltd1 69 (Geotherm). 
In Geotherm, 170 Geotherm claimed that Electricorp had u ed its dominant position 
for the proscribed purposes in the Act by exercising its statutory rights. Gault J considered 
the passage quoted above in Australasian Peiforming Right Association Ltd v Ceridale Pty 
Ltd. 171 Having considered that passage, Gault J went onto state that: 172 
If those views are considered to be open on the Australian s 46 it can be argued with some 
strength that the exercise of statutory rights will not necessarily be beyond the scope of the 
New Zealand s 36 ... If in a particular case they [section 3(8) factors] are an element of a 
dominant position and are used in the course of the exercise of statutory rights for a 
proscribed purpose s 36 might be breached. It is difficult to envisage a s ituation in which 
there will be contravention by the reasonable exerci e of rights of objection .. . 
That the introduction of s [36(3)) was considered necessary to exclude the enforcement of the 
statutory intellectual property right seems con istent with this approach. 
169 Geotherm above n 38. 
170 Geotherm above n 38. 
171 Ceridale above n 161 , 52,129, per Olney J. Cited in Geotherm above n 38, 651. 
172 Geotherm above n 38. 651 - 652, per Gault J. 
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Gault goes on to state the test for a mere exercise of statutory rights that is referred to in 
Telecom v Clear173: 174 
... it is difficult to suppose that a contravention of the Act will be established by the mere 
reasonable exercise of rights of objection. It is as well to expand on this .... Something more 
would have to be shown to bring conduct within s 36. 
If the exercise of the right was more than a reasonable exercise of statutory rights, then the 
conduct could be liable to scrutiny under section 36 the Act. Regrettably in Telecom v 
Clear, 
175 
the Court did not go on to consider or state whether the test set out in 
Geotherm 176 should be applied to section 36(3) when considering the exclusions for 
intellectual property in the Act. Nor did the court go on to explain what would constitute 
"something more". 
Telecom v Clear177 does leave open the question of whether the Geotherm test is the 
correct test to apply to section 36(3). If it is, it has been suggested that ection 36(3) is no 
longer needed. 178 Presumably if the approach in Geotherm 179 is taken , then the concern i 
whether an unreasonable enforcement of statutory intellectual property rights, or 
something more than a reasonable enforcement has occurred. 
180 One can assume an 
unreasonable enforcement of statutory intellectual property rights would not fall into 
section 36(3), and the conduct would be liable to enquiry under section 36(2). One 
173 Telecom v Clear above n I 59. 
174 Geotherm above n 38, 654, per Gault J. 
175 Telecom v Clear above n 159. 
176 Geotherm above n 38. 
177 Telecom v Clear above n 159. 
178 Brooker 's Gault on Commercial Law above n 42, CA36.33. 
179 Geotherm above n 38. 
180 Brooker's Gault on Commercial Law above n 42, CA36.33, 3 - 170. 
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commentator argues that this is what is meant by the inclusion of the words "by reason 
only that" in section 36(3). 181 Thus asking the question whether section 36(3) is really 
necessary in light of the test in Geotherm.182 Perhaps all that should be said is that the test 
in Geotherm 183 is compatible or consi stent with the aims of section 36(3) rather than that 
section 36(3) is superfluous. 
What the inclusion of such express exclusions does do however, is provide greater 
certainty for intellectual property rights owners. Yvonne van Roy state that thi s is exactly 
the reason section 36(3) was passed.184 It tell s intellectual property rights owners th at 
merely enforcing statutory intellectual property ri ghts will not be considered to be abu ing 
a substantial degree of power in a market. Coupled with the indications from other 
jurisdictions that merely owning intellectual property rights does not confer a substantial 
degree of market power or a dominant position, intellectual property ri ghts owners should 
feel comfortable exploiting their intellectual property without fallin g foul of competition 
law. Such "comfort" should encourage innovators and creators to explo it their intellectual 
property, thereby providing an incenti ve to c reate and then exploit intellectual property, 
and providing an incenti ve for others to do the same. The exclu ion in secti on 36(3) can be 
considered to be part of the reward neces ary to bring forward innovati on. 185 
If the inclusion of section 36(3) is part of the reward for innovati on, does New 
Zealand value intellectual property more so th an its contemporary Au trali a, or other 
jurisdictions th at do not have a similar provisio n? The OECD states th at how competiti on 
policy authorities treat the questi o n of reward fo r innovati on is crucial to determinin g how 
181 Brooker 's Gault on Commercial Law above n 42, CA36.33, 3 - 170. Sec fu rther under " D "By Reason 
Only That" in Section 36(3)" for further considerati on of the words "by reason only that". 
182 Ceotherm above n 38, 654. 
183 Ceotherm above n 38, 654. 
184 Y vonne van Roy above n 55, 3 1. A t the time Yvonne van Roy"s book was written the intellectual property 
exclusion was s 36(2) of the Commerce Act 1986, ra ther than s 36(3) as it currentl y is. She describes the 
purpose of the section as being to "allev iate fear ., that enforcement of in tellect 11 al property ri ghts would be 
considered anti competiti ve. 
185 0 ECD above n 18, 12. 
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to analyse the competitive effects o: intellectual property licensing practices. 186 Section 
36(3) could indicate that the New Zealand government believes that permitting innovators 
to fully appropriate their surpluses is in fact pro-competitive. 187 
D "By Reason Only That" in Section 36(3) 
The Act uses the phrase "by reason only that", rather than just "by reason that". It is 
likely that the word "only" is there to overcome the situation where an intellectual property 
right is being enforced and this activity is undertaken in conjunction with another activity 
which could be seen as anti competitive. 188 If the word "only" was not there, it may have 
been interpreted that the anti competitive conduct was exempt from scrutiny because it was 
done in conjunction with an enforcement of statutory intellectual property rights. It would 
seem contrary to the objective of the Act if intellectual property rights owners could 
undertake anti competitive conduct at the same time as intellectual property rights 
enforcement and be immune from scrutiny. 
It could also be argued that if the word "only" was not in the sub ection, that if the 
intellectual property right owner is enforcing his or her intellectual property right and 
conducting other anti competitive activitie , that both the anti competitive conduct and the 
enforcement of the intellectual property right would be immune from challenge.
189 
Douglas C. Calhoun and Brendan W. F. Brown (Calhoun and Brown) argue that the 
usual meaning or object of the phrase "only" is to achieve the re ult that the particular 
conduct in issue, without more, will not be vulnerable to critici m but that, if additional 
conduct is undertaken with the former, then the entirety of the conduct may be subject to 
186 OECD above n 18, 12. 
187 OECD above n 18, 12. 
188 Douglas C. Calhoun and Brendan W. F. Brown above n 4, 441. 
189 That is the interpretati on given by Douglas C. Calhoun and Brendan W . F. Brown above n 4, 441. 
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scrutiny.
19° Calhoun and Brown gi\ e the example of an intellectual property rights owner 
who has a licensing agreement. Some of the terms of the licen e may be anti competitive. 
According to Calhoun and Brown's interpretation, the intellectual property rights owner 
runs the risk that if he or she seeks to enforce the terms of the licen e, then he or she may 
disqualify him or her self from the exemption given in section 36(3) completely. This is 
because the intellectual property rights owner as licensee is seeking to do more than just 
enforce a statutory intellectual property right. Calhoun and Brown consider that in that 
event, the effect of the words "by reason only" is that the whole conduct, not just the 
enforcement of the anti competitive clauses of the licensing agreement, are open to 
challenge. Even the parts of the licen ing agreement that relate to enforcing a statutory 
intellectual property right could be challenged under section 36(3). 
While Calhoun and Brown's interpretation may be correct, the writer favours the 
interpretation that the enforcement of the intellectual property right will always be immune 
from challenge, but any additional anti competitive conduct undertaken at the same time, 
or as part of the same agreement, i not. Anti competitive conduct that is additional to 
enforcing statutory intellectual property rights, for example, as part of a licensing 
agreement, can be considered to be taking advantage of a substantial degree of market 
power. The writer does not consider that the entirety of the conduct hould be subject to 
scrutiny where there is enforcement of intellectual property right and another anti 
competitive conduct undertaken by the intellectual property right holder. The seeking to 
enforce intellectual property rights hould alway be immune from challenge in order to 
encourage the production of intellectual property, and the benefit that flow from that.
191 
190 Douglas C. Calhoun and Brendan W. F. Brown above n 4. 441. 
191 It is noted here that both interpretations arc considered in L.F. Hampton above n 4, 674; the presence of 
additional conduct allows the entirety of the conduct to be subject to scrutiny, and, the enforcement if 
accompanied by additional conduct might not be a breach of 36(2). There is no preference exrresscd for 
either interpretation of the statute in that text however. 
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E How Would Magill be Treated under Section 36? 
I Section 36(2) 
Several New Zealand commentators have suggested that Magill is in line with 
Geotherm where "something more" is required than the mere exercise of statutory 
rights.
192 
"Exceptional circumstances" and "reasonable exercise of statutory rights" or 
"something more" all aim to catch only actions that are beyond ordinary exercises of 
intellectual property rights. However it i considered that Magill wa wrongly decided, the 
circumstances not being exceptional but being an exercise of tatutory rights. 
What New Zealand courts would decide under section 36(2) if faced with a Magill 
type situation will depend on whether the comprehensive television guide was con idered 
to be a derivative market and whether the court considers that the copyright extends to the 
comprehensive television guide. The same result may not occur, as it is arguable that the 
appellants did no more than exercise their statutory rights. In Geotherm terms, there was a 
reasonable exercise of statutory rights. Of more concern here, is how far the court would 
allow the exclusive right in copyright to extend. 
2 Suing for copyright infringement in Magill 
Not only did the broadcasters refuse to license the television listings in Magill, but 
they also successfully sued for copyright infringement when Magill went ahead and used 
the television listings for its own comprehensive weekly television guide. It seem fairly 
clear what the position would be under ew Zealand law if Magill claimed that suing for 
copyright infringement was taking advantage of a substantial degree of power in a 
192 L.F. Hampton above n 4, 675 and Brooker's Gault on Commercial Law above n 42, CA36.33, 3 - 170(a). 
In Brooker's Gault on Commercial Law above n 42, CA36.33, 3 - I 70(a) it is suggested that s 36 would be 
interpreted in a manner that is consistent with Magill. And in L.F. Hampton above n 4, 675, that the 
circumstances based approach adopted in Magill has much to commend and is in line with the Queensland 
Wire and Geotherm approaches to s 36. 
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market.
193 
Copyright is one of the statutory intellectual property rights under section 45(2) 
of the Act. 194 
It is likely that the broadcasters would invoke section 36(3) and claim that they did 
not take advantage of a substantial degree of power in a market by reason only that they 
were seeking to enforce a statutory intellectual property right, namely copyright. This 
defence would no doubt be successful as it was in Telecom v Clear when Telecom 
threatened to take legal action against Clear for infringing copyright. 195 Presuming that the 
broadcasters have a substantial degree of power in a market, seeking to enforce the 
copyright in the television listings was seeking to enforce a statutory intellectual property 
right. 
3 Refusing to license 
In Magill the broadcasters sued for copyright infringement and refused to license. 
Could the broadcasters in Magill take advantage of section 36(3) for the refusal to license? 
While suing for copyright infringement clearly is seeking to enforce an intellectual 
property right, refusing to license is not so clearly "seeking to enforce an intellectual 
property right". It is arguable that purely pas ive conduct, refusing to license, is not 
"seeking to enforce". 196 Both suing for infringement and refusing to license intellectual 
property rights are different sides of the ame coin. Both actions relate to the owner 
193 Assuming that the works in question were ubjcct to copyright protection in New Zealand, and there was 
no other Act which provided for compulsory licensing of television listings in New Zealand. 
194 The Copyright Act 1994. 
195 In Telecom v Clear above n 159, 576, Smellie J in the High Court found that threatening legal action for 
infringing copyright is expressly excluded from section 36(2) by reason of section 36(3), because "the pursuit 
of copyright (or other intellectual property rights) i considered appropriate". 
196 There i some doubt as to whether a refusal to license would fall into the s 36(3) exclusion: Abraham I van 
Melle ·'Competition Law and Refusals to License Intellectual Property" [ 1995] NZLJ 318, 319 and L.F. 
Hampton above n 4, 674. L.F. Hampton above n 4, 674 asserts that on both a purposive interpretation and for 
policy reasons, s 36(3) must exempt passive conduct in the form of refusals to grant intellectual property 
licenses. 
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enforcing his or her exclusivity and ~aying "these are my exclu ive rights and you may not 
use them". As copyright is an exclu ive right, then by refu ing to license, the broadcasters 
are merely enforcing that exclusive right, by "choosing how to exploit his exclusive rights" 
as Laddie J put it in Ingman. 197 And further, "[i]t is the ability to grant or refuse such 
hcenses which constitutes the right in the fir t place", so the broadcasters are seekjng to 
enforce that right by saying no to third parties who wish to u e that right. 198 
Applying Geotherm, where Gault J stated that "[i]t is difficult to envisage a situation 
in which there will be a contravention [of section 36] by the reasonable exercise of right ", 
as the broadcasters were choosing how to exploit their exclu ive rights, they were 
reasonably exercising their rights, and therefore not in breach of section 36(2). 
It is arguable that as New Zealand has specific intellectual property rights exclusions 
in the Act, New Zealand courts would be less likely to find conduct such as in Magill 
contrary to section 36. Because there are specific intellectual property rights exclusions, it 
could be argued this indicates the value of intellectual property protection, and the 
reluctance for competition law to interfere with the rights granted. 199 This is consistent 
with Telecom v Clear, Geotherm and the Australian cases where it seems accepted that 
competition law will tolerate competitors reasonably taking advantage of other statutory 
rights. 
It remains to be seen whether the ame course would be followed in New Zealand. 
However, given that New Zealand ha specific intellectual property exclusion , it i hoped 
that the intellectual property rights would be given more primacy than they were by the 
European Court of Justice. 
197 fngman above n 102, 127, para 40. 
198 Ing man above n I 02, 131, para 53, per Laddie J. 
199 This is consistent with the Opinion or Advocate General Gulmann in Magill above n 37 , para 14 
(Opinion), where he states that where copyright confors an exclusi vc right, that right must be respected by 
competition law. 
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4 Refusing to license and suin5 for copyright infringement 
Take the interpretation that suing for copyright infringement is seeking to enforce an 
intellectual property right, and refusing to license is not, and is considered to be abuse of 
market power.200 If this is argued, what effect do the words "by reason only that" have on 
the combined conduct if undertaken simultaneously? 
If Calhoun and Brown 's interpretation of the words "by reason only that" in section 
36(3) is favoured, then both suing for copyright infringement and refusing to license lose 
the benefit of section 36(3) and are subject to section 36(2). This would be because the 
entirety of the conduct may be subject to scrutiny. It is accepted that the refusing to license, 
if considered an abuse of market power, should not be able to hide behind the copyright 
infringement action for the purposes of competition law. However, it would seem unfair to 
lose the benefit of a statutory exclusion because the conduct was combined with another 
action not subject to the statutory exclusion. Furthermore, if the broadcaster had 
successfully sued for copyright infringement, they may have considered themselves on safe 
ground in terms of competition law, given that the courts had just affirmed their 
entitlement to the exclusive right, being copyright. As was stated in CIRCA v Renault "to 
prevent the application of the national legi slation in such circumstances would therefore be 
tantamount to challenging the very existence of that right. "201 
It could also be argued that the copyright was a tool used to leverage market power, 
and abuse it. Therefore it is just to remove the benefit of the exclu ion and scrutini se the 
entire conduct. 
200 That is, refusing to license is considered to be taki ng advan tage of a ubstantiaJ degree of power in a 
market for one of the prescribed purposes. 
201 CIRCA v Renault [ 1988] ECR 6039, 607 1, para 11. Read thi s in conjuncti on with Alan Bollard's 
statement in Comment on th e Commerce Act / 986 Review (NZIER. Wellington , 1989) 7 above n 126, that 
there is a danger that the Act may be used as a backdoor way for other compani es to access a private 
intellectual property right for free. 
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F Other Cases under Section ]6 
1 Relevant principles 
Volvo, Oscar Bronner and Jngman emulate a consistent theme, that generally 
intellectual property rights owners should not be forced to license intellectual property 
rights. This is perhaps consistent with the intellectual property exclusions in the Act. Oscar 
Bronner opens the door more than Volvo to the likelihood that intellectual property rights 
owners could be forced to supply their goods or services in exceptional circumstance . 
Ingman though has strong statements that intellectual property rights owners are entitled to 
refuse to license. 
The relevant principles to be taken into consideration from Oscar Bronner could be 
summarised as: 
(a) Particular care must be taken in relation to obliging an intellectual property right 
owner to supply his or her goods or services; 
(b) Only where there is a permanent exclusion on a related market hould an intellectual 
prope,ty rights owner be obliged to supply; 
(c) There must be a "genuine stranglehold" on a related market; and 
(d) If obliged to supply, the intellectual property rights owner must be fully compensated. 
In Volvo it was held that an intellectual property rights owner could be obliged to 
supply in exceptional circumstances. Circumstances that could oblige supply were said to 
be when spare parts were arbitrarily refused to repairers, exces ive prices were being 
charged or when the spare parts were no longer being made when there remained a large 
number of vehicles of that model on the road. It was also aid though that even for a 
reasonable royalty an obligation to license would deprive the intellectual property right 
owner of his or her exclusive right. Thi seems to be the main difference between Oscar 
Bronner and Volvo. Oscar Bronner indicated a willingness to oblig" to licen e intellectual 
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property rights provided the owner was fully compensated.202 Volvo seems to indicate that 
royalties are not sufficient as the intellectual property rights owner is being deprived of his 
or her exclusive right. Furthermore, this exclusive right extends to derivative markets. It is 
common for intellectual property rights owners to produce and sell products which 
incorporate the original work, that is, on a derivative market. 203 
The relevant principles to be taken into consideration from Jngman are: 
(a) The right to refuse licenses form part of the exclusive right granted; 
(b) An intellectual property rights holder is entitled to refuse to licen e; 
(c) Volvo is good law, and if claiming that intellectual property rights must be licen ed, it 
must be expressly shown why Volvo does not apply; and 
(d) Magill is an exceptional case and it must similarly be expre sly shown that exceptional 
circumstances exist that take the case at hand outside an ordinary refusal to license 
intellectual property rights case. 
2 Suing for intellectual property rights infringemenr204 
There seems no doubt that in IMS Health, Volvo and lngman, the action of suing for 
copyright, design and patent infringement would benefit from the ection 36(3) exclu ion 
in the Act. 
202 The test for refusal to supply as set out in Oscar Bronner for where the owner must licen e is if the acti on 
of the intellectual property ri ghts owner arc likely to eliminate all competiti on in the downstream market; the 
actions were incapable of objective justification; and the products are indi pensablc to businc in that 
downstream market, in that there are no actual or potential substitutes. 
203 Magill above n 37, para I 07 (Opini on). In a United States decision it was expressed that the copyri ght 
owner has the ri ght to seek to control reproduction and distribution of their copyright works and this includes 
the ri ght to curb the development of derivative markets by refu ing to license the copyri ght work : A&M 
Records Inc and Others v Napster Inc [200 I] IPR 232 citing UMG Recordings 92 F Supp 2d 35 1 in support . 
This is considered to be the same as saying the copyright owner has exc lusive rights in derivative markets in 
respect of copyri ght works. 
204 In IMS Health, Volvo and lngman the intellectual property rights owners all sued for infringement of their 
intellectual property rights and were successful in those su its. Oscar Bronner wa not a case concerning 
intellectual property ri ghts, but a delivery network. 
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3 Refusing to license 
IMS Health and Magill are rea onably imilar in term of the effect the copyright had 
on the market.
205 
A New Zealand court would be likely to reach the ame deci ion for both. 
Therefore the comments above in relation to how a Magill type ituation would be treated 
under section 36, apply also to any determination of an IMS Health type situation. 
The principle in Volvo and Ingman, that, generally. intellectual property right 
owners are entitled to refuse to license, i considered to be con i tent with Telecom ,. Clear 
and Geotherm, where it was said to be rare to contravene ection 36 by means of a 
reasonable exercise of statutory right . 
Volvo concerned a refusal to license the supply of replacement car part protected by 
design registration. Applying Geotherm, was there '· omething more" than a rea onable 
enforcement of intellectual property right ? Arguably not as Volvo imply maintained their 
exclusive right to the products protected by the design. 
In Ingman, Philips offered to license a patent to Ingman for compact di cs. Ingman 
refused the terms of the license and made the compact discs regardle . It is hard to ee 
how Philips's offering of standard licensing terms could be een a an unreasonable 
exercise of statutory rights in the ab ence of obscenely high pricing. 206 Patentee are 
entitled to exploit their inventions. 
Oscar Bronner reflected on intellectual property rights, but wa a case about acces 
to a delivery network.207 However, Oscar Bronner repre ents a afer middle ground 
205 Both concerned copyright, and in both situation it was impos ible to reproduce the material in , inually 
any format without infringing the copyright. In both cases the copyright protection was \alid, as both 
copyright owners were successful in defending their copyright. yet both types of work included information. 
In the case of Magill the information was television listings. In IMS Healrh the information wa 
pharmaceutical sales data. In both cases the copyright owners had a de facto mon::-poly in the information. 
206 Laddie J in fngman did not comment on the pricing terms of the licen e. 
207 The case concerned a refusal of access to a deli, ery network for nc"'"spapers. 
58 
between Magill and IMS Health on one end of the spectrum, and Volvo and Jngman on the 
other. New Zealand courts may follow this middle ground, as it may result in more 
competitive markets, by requiring licenses only where the intellectual property rights 
owner has a genuine stranglehold on the market, but at the same time providing for 
adequate reward for innovation and research and development. 
VII SECTION 45 
Section 45(1) is aimed at licensing arrangements in relation to tatutory intellectual 
property rights, and states that nothing else in the Act apart from section 36, 36A, 37, and 
38 apply. This provides a broad exclusion to purely permissive intellectual property 
licenses to most sections of the Act. 208 Provided the intellectual property license goes no 
further than the intellectual property right itself, the license will be exempt. Where the 
license gains collateral advantages, the license will not benefit from the exclu ions. 
However the section does allow intellectual property rights owners to divide and license 
the entirety of the rights. 
Wherever an intellectual property right exists, there is a potential market in licenses 
to exploit it. 209 It has been said that it is the ability to grant or refuse licen e which 
constitutes the right in the fir t place.210 Where an intellectual property rights owner 
licenses rights that she or he already holds, this type of licensing will most likely be 
exempt. For example, an exclu ive license, a territorial restriction or a field of u e 
restriction, are just portions of the intellectual property rights owner's rights in any case, 
208 As explained in General Talking Pictures Co v Western Electric Co. ( 1931) 304 US 175, 181, a license 
authorises a person to do things that would violate one or more of the exclusive rights. And this is how s 45 
functions, s 45 allows licensors and licensees to make arrangements that would otherwise violate one or more 
of the exclu ive rights. 
209 Licensing is an important aspect of intellectual property rights. An intellectual property rights owner may 
not have the ability to exploit the intellectual property themselves, and the only way to commercially exploit 
the intellectual property right will be to license the right. 
210 fngman above n I 02, 131, para 53, per Laddie J. Laddie J also stated that the proprietor owns exclusive 
rights which he can exploit, if he wi hes, by licen ing: Ing man above n I 02, 131, para 53, per Laddie J. 
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and gain no collateral advantages. Such licenses merely pass on some or all of the rights to 
the licensee. 
Agreements that tie goods or services not protected by intellectual property rights, 
extend beyond the term of the intellectual property rights, package licensing, grantbacks, 
patent pooling, cross licensing and exclu ive dealing may be agreements that are not 
authorised by the intellectual property right. Such agreements may be found to 
substantially lessen competition. The following sections explore relevant case law, 
compare the equivalent Australian section, assess the types of conduct that would or would 
not benefit from the exclusion in section 45 and argues that non-statutory intellectual 
property rights should be included in section 45. 
A Case Law 
The equivalent Australian prov1s1on to section 45, is section 51 (3) of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
211 
The only Australian ea e considering section 51 (3) is 
Transfield Pty Ltd v Arla International Ltd.212 In that case Arlo claimed that Tran field had 
breached a "best endeavours" clause in relation to developing and marketing a pole. 
Transfield counter claimed that the clause was anti competitive because it restricted their 
ability to compete in the market for pole .213 Arlo's reply was that the clause was not anti 
competitive and even if it was, the clause was protected by ection 51 (3). 
211 Section 5 I (3) is attached as Annex V. This exempts intellectual property rights licenses from collusive 
conduct which are contracts, arrangements or understandings which contain an cxcl usionary provision or 
have the purpose and effect of substantially lessening competition (s 45), a contract, arrangement or 
understanding in relation to price if it substantially le scns competition (s 45A), exclu ive dealing (s 47) and 
acquisitions which substantially lessening competition (ss 50, 50A). Imellectual property rights licenses are 
not exempted from using a substantial degree of market power for one of the proscribed purposes (s 46, 
46A) or resale price maintenance (s 48). 
212 Transfie/d Pty Ltd v Arla lnternariona/ Lid ( 1980) 144 CLR 83. There is no New Zealand ea e considering 
s 45 of the Act. 
213 Transficld had tendered to another organisation. The other organisation was concerned about the 
suitability of the Arlo pole. Transfield suggested using a pole that it had designed itself. When Transfield wa. 
awarded the contract, Arlo ued. 
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The court found that the clause was not anti competitive, and only three of the five 
judges went on to consider whether section 51 (3) would have protected the clause. The 
three judges who did consider section 51 (3) all found that the clause would have fallen 
within section 51 (3).2 14 
Mason J considered that the words "relates to" in section 51 (3) are too nairnw and 
give section 51(3) a restrictive operation. 215 Mason J also went on to state that the policie 
of the Patents Act 1952 (Cth) and the Trade Practices Act l 974 (Cth) are compatible. He 
recognised that patentees are entitled to impose conditions upon licensees in order to 
protect the legal monopoly. He expressed that section 51 (3) determines the scope of the 
restrictions a patentee may impose and conditions which seek to gain collateral advantages 
will not fall within section 51 (3).
216 
Therefore it would need to be examined under section 
51(3) whether the condition is within the scope of the intellectual property right. It is 
reasonable to expect that New Zealand could and would use thi s "collateral advantage" 
test. 
B Comparison of Section 45 of the Act and Section 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth) 
Section 51 (3) seems quite different in scope and effect to section 45 of the Act. The 
main difference seems to be that the Au tralian provision is much more limited in what 
type of intellectual property rights licenses it protects.217 
214 Only Mason J went on to deal with section 51 (3) in any detail. 
215 
New Zealand removed the words " relates to" from the Commerce Act 1986 with the amendments made to 
the Act in 1990. 
216 Trans.field Pry Ltd v Arlo International Ltd above n 2 12, I 02 - I 03. 
217 Secti on 45 protects any permi ss i ve contract, arrangement or understanding in relation to statutory 
intellectual property ri ghts, or to any act done to give effec t to such a contract, arrangement or understanding. 
Section 51 (3) is limited to "conditions" of licenses in s 5 1 (3)(a)( iii ) to (vi) in relation to patents, des igns, 
copyright or EL under the Circuits L ayouts Act 1989 and s 5 1 (3)(c)(i ) and (ii ) ir1 relation to trade marks. The 
exemption for patent license is limited to the in vention to whi ch the patent relates. The exemption for design 
licenses is limited to the goods the des ign is or is to be applied to. The exemption for copyri ght licenses is 
limited to the work or other subject maller of the copyri ght. The exemption for EL under Circuits L ayout Act 
1989 is limited to the eligible layout. The exemption for trade mark li censes is limited to the kind s, qualities 
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In order to fall within section 45 there must be a contract, arrangement or 
understanding containing a provision authori sing a permissive act in relation to statutory 
intellectual property rights. A statutory intellectual property right is a right, privilege or 
entitlement conferred or acknowledged as valid under the li sted statutory intellectual 
property rights .
218 A "right, privilege or entitlement" must rel ate to the exclusive rights 
granted by virtue of the intellectual property rights.
219 
In order to fall within section 51 (3) there must be a condition of a patent, design or 
copyright.
220 That condition must "relate to" the invention or articles made by the u e of 
the invention, or the goods to which the design is applied or work or other ubject matter of 
the copyright.
221 Or there must be a contract, arrangement or understanding authori sing the 
use of a certification trade mark or the inclusion of a provision rel ating to kinds, qualities 
or standards of goods bearin g the trade mark. The exemption in re lation to s 45 . is in s 45(2), namely a ri ght, 
pri vil ege or entitl ement that is conferred or acknowledged as valid by the named tatutory inte llectual 
property ri ghts . It would therefore need to be examined what are the di ffe rences in scope between what is 
authori sed by the statutory inte ll ectual property ri ghts in s 45(2) and the limitations in s 5 1 (3). 
218 Refer to s 45 for the li st of statutes, but the ri ghts are patents, des igns, trade mark , copyri ght, plant 
varie ti es, and layout designs. Section 5 1 (3) does not include pl ant variety ri ghts prov ided by the Plant 
Breeders' Rights Act 1994 (Cth) in the exemption. Nor does s 5 1 (3) inc lude services in re lati on to trade 
marks, as provided by the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). 
219 In re lation to trade marks, thi s must be the exclusive right to use the trade mark in application to the 
specifi ed goods or services: Trade Marks Act 1953, s 8. In re lati on to patents thi s must be the excl usive right 
to make, use or sell the in vention: Patent Regul ations 1954, Letter Patent, Third Schedul e. In relation to 
des igns thi s must be the exclusive ri ght to make, sell , import or hire the arti c le to which the des ign ha been 
applied : Des igns Act, s 11 . In re lati on to copyri ght thi s must be the right et out in the Copyright Act 1994, s 
16 including the exc lusive ri ght to copy the work, perform the work in publi c and broadcast the work and 
further, the exclusive ri ght to authori se o ther persons to do any of the acts. In connecti on with pl ant vari eti es 
thi s must be the ri ght to produce for sale or sell reproducti ve materi a l o f a protected vari ety: Plant Vari ety 
Ri ghts Act. s 17. Pres umably thi s also incl udes the ri ght to ass ign the intell ec tual prope11y right, and to 
Jic;nse the ri ght. A correlati ve of the excl usive ri ght to use is the right to sue for in fringement of the 
un authori sed use o f the exclusive ri ght. The words "pri vil ege" and "entitl ement" are not used in the 
intell ectu al property statutes, the word "right" or "rights" are usuall y used . It is not clear why the word 
"pri vil ege" and "entitl ement" are also used in s 45, or exactl y what those words mean in re lation to 
inte ll ectual propert y ri ghts. Nor what it adds to the section beyond "rights·'. 
no Or a pending patent or design or assignment of a patent, design or copyright. 
221 Secti on 5 1 (3) also incl udes the e li gible layout in respect of whi ch EL ri ghts subsi t. 
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or standards of goods between a t1 ade mark proprietor and a registered user of the trade 
mark.222 
The provisions in relation to patent license exclu ions in Au tralia and New Zealand 
seem similar, both naturally relate to the invention. And similarly with the design licensing 
exclusion, both to the goods or article to which the design has been applied. The copyright 
exclusions both relate to the work or subject matter of the work. The trade mark provision 
are the most different. Section 51(3) limits the exemption to agreements in relation to 
kinds, qualities or standards of goods, and not to services at all. Whereas a right, privilege 
or entitlement in relation to a trade mark must relate to the exclusive u e in relation to 
goods or services in the Trade Marks Act 1953, there being no mention of kinds, qualities 
or standards in the Trade Marks Act 1953.
223 Section 51 (3) would not exempt a territorial 
license in relation to trade marks, because a territorial license is not a kind, quality or 
standard of goods. However a territorial license gains no collateral advantage to the 
intellectual property right as the owner had rights in the whole of that territory in any ea e. 
Even if a territorial license does not benefit from section 51 (3) uch a license is unlikely to 
substantially lessen competition. Territorial restriction may decrease intrabrand 
competition, but they may increase interbrand competition. 
The Australian exemption only extends to pending patents and de igns, wherea the 
New Zealand exemption extends to pending patents, design , trade marks and plant variety 
rights. 
222 That registered user must be a registered user under the Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth), Part IX. 
223 Nor is there any mention of kind, quality or standard of goods or . ervices in the Trade Marks Act 1955 
(Cth). There is debate about what the true purpose of a trade mark, given that this is not defined in any trade 
mark legislation. The most commonly accepted purpose is that a trade mark acts as a badge of origin for the 
traders goods and/or services, that is distinguishing the owner's goods and/or services from those of other 
traders or competitors. See Re Powell's Trade Mark [1893] 2 Ch 385 (CA); Arisroc Ltd v Rysta Ltd [1945] 
AC 68 (HL) and Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Centrafarm [ 1978] ECR 1139, para 7. More recently it has 
been argued that the purpose of a trade mark is to indicate quality. ce Colgate-Palmolive Ltd v Markwell 
Finance Ltd [ 1989] RPC 497, 535 (CA). However, there are no provisions for quality in New Zealand or 
Australian trade mark legislation. 
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The Australian exemption states what rights in relation to intellectual property it 
relates to. The New Zealand exemption leaves one to infer that a ri ght, privilege or 
entitlement is connected to the exclu ive ri ghts granted by the intellectual property statutes 
themselves.
224 
Therefore the New Zealand exemption is arguably broader. It appears that in 
New Zealand, more statutory intellectual property rights owner are likely to fall within the 
licensing exemption than in Australia.225 Furthermore, section 51 (3) is unnecessarily 
complex when it could be asked if the license seeks to gain a "collateral advantage". 
In this era of harmonisation, it is curious that New Zeal and 's intellectual property 
exclusions for competition law are quite different to Australi a's.226 The most notable 
difference is that the New Zeal and provisions appear to provide greater protecti on for 
intellectual property rights from competition law. Thi s approach is preferable. It provides 
greater certainty for intellectual property ri ghts owners. Furthermore, intell ectual property 
rights owners are able to spend less time and money ensuring their acti vitie compl y with 
competition Jaw and more time creating and innovating and so on. This certainty and scope 
224 Gi ven that the New Zealand exemption appli es to pu rely perm issive acts (a prov ision authori sing any act 
that would otherwi se be prohibited by reason of the ex istence of a tatutory inte ll ectual property r ight), and 
that an intell ectual property ri ght owner may do what he or she wishes in respect o f li censing the excl usive 
ri ght, provided he or she does not go beyond the right itself, then one can in fer that the "right, pri vil ege or 
entitl ement" must be directl y connected to the exclus ive rights granted by the inte ll ectual propert y sta tutes 
themselves. 
225 In Australi a the repeal of s 5 1 (3) has been reco mmended by the Inte ll ectual Property & Competition 
Rev iew Committee. In pl ace of s 5 1 (3) it ha been recommended that the intell ectual property s tatute in tead 
be amended to ensure that a contravention of Part IV o f the Trade Prac ti ces Act I 974 (Cth), or of s 4D of that 
Act, shall not be taken to have been committed by rea on of the imposing of conditions in a li cense, or the 
inclusion of conditi ons in a contract, arrangement or understanding, that relate to the subject matter of that 
inte llectual property statute, so long as those conditions do not result, or arc not likely to result , in a 
substanti al lessening of competiti on: Intell ectu al Property & Competiti on Rev iew Committee above n 37, 35. 
As o f yet, no change has been made to the Trade Practi ces Ac t 1974 (Cth) or the individual intell ectual 
property statutes to reOect thi s recommendation. The writer considers that the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth ) 
is correct place for inte llectual property rights exempti ons for that Act. T he exempti ons houl d si t in the Act 
that the exemptions appl y to. However, the writer con iders that no harm is done by inc luding the exemptions 
in both the competiti on statute and in the various inte ll ectual property right statutes. Or at least a cross 
reference in each statute. 
226 See Apple & Pear Marke1ing Board 1• Apple Fields Lid [ 1989) ZLR 158, 164 (CA), where Cooke P (as 
he was then) states that Austra li an uni fo rmity and rec iprocity in commerci:i l goa ls is to be pursued by the 
Courts as well as by the legislatu re. Cooke P c ites Dominion Ren! A Car Ltd v Budge! Ren! A Car Syslems 
(I 970) Ltd [ 1987] 2 NZLR 395, 407 and Taylor Bros Lid v Tay/ors Croup Ltd [ 1988) 2 NZLR I, 39 in 
support. 
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of protection may actually encourage innovation. In general, express exclusions for 
intellectual property rights are desirable. 
C Tying227 
Tying a good or service not protected by intellectual property rights to one that is so 
protected, is not an act that would otherwise be prohibited by rea on of the existence of an 
intellectual property right. The non-tied good or service, has nothing to do with the 
intellectual property right. Such licenses may substantially lessen competition for the tied 
good. 
D Grantbacks 
Grantback licenses are licenses that reqmre the licen ee to grant back any 
improvements made to the intellectual property to the licensor. Thi naturally is something 
that would go beyond the intellectual property right itself and would not benefit from the 
section 45 exclusion.228 
E Patent Pooling and Cross Licensing 
Patent pooling and cross licen ing may benefit from ection 45, despite these 
licensing activities having potentially anti competitive effects.
229 Patent pooling and cro 
licensing are horizontal arrangements where intellectual property rights holders license 
only each other's intellectual property.
230 There may be other competitors left out of the 
227 Tying is set out above under s 36. 
228 S. G Corones in his book Restrictive Trade Practices (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1994) 398, 
consider that grantback provisions may reduce the incentive for the licensee to invest in research and 
development, and may substantially lessen competition. 
229 Concern has been expressed about the equivalent Au tralian provision, Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 
51 (3), exempting potentially anti competitive horizontal arrangements betwePn competitors. See Intellectual 
Property & Competition Review Committee above n 37. 27. 
230 Patent pooling may involve two or more patent owners, whereas cross licensing is an agreement between 
only two competitors. 
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pool or arrangement. This practice is potentially most detrimental to competition where 
intellectual property rights owners hold substitute technology but less so where the 
technology is complementary.231 Thi s behaviour may limit output or raise prices with the 
effect of substantially lessening competition.232 The benefits to the parties may just be 
greater access to intellectual property. However, the parties to the agreement need no 
longer compete so vigorously with each other once they can license each other's good or 
services. 
Patent pooling or cross licensing may fall into the section 45 exemption however as 
the intellectual property rights owner does no more than pass on the inherent exclusivity of 
the right. 233 
F Exclusive Dealing 
Exclusive dealing involves a contract, arrangement or understanding where the 
licensor prohibits the purchase of goods or service other than from him or herself. 
Ordinarily such arrangements are subject to section 27 of the Act, "substantially le ening 
competition".234 Further, if intellectual property rights are involved, section 45 is unlikely 
231 John W . Schlicher above n 131, 167, tales that where patent owners hold substitute or even 
complementary patents, a court may condemn that agreement if it find s that the agreement has the effect of 
limiting their competitiveness with respect to the indi vidually exploiting or licensing those rights, ee 
Standard Oil Co. v United States (193 1) 238 U.S. 163. 
232 The example given above under s 36, was that if in Magill the broadca ters licensed each other' 
televi sion listings, consumers would have the ad vantage of a new product. however the mark would still not 
be competitive. Competiti on may be limited as other competitors do not have access to those intellectual 
property ri ghts necessary to engage in that market. 
233 Cartels occur where actual or potenti al competitors fi x prices, limit output or di vide markets. Patent 
pooling and cross licensing are considered to be forms of cartels: M ass imilli ano Gangi above n 2. 359. The 
OECD state that cartels are the single greatest concern fac ing competiti on authoriti es when rev iewing 
intellectual property licensing agreements: OECD above n 18. 23. 
234 In the case of Fisher & Payke/ Ltd v Commerce Commission [ 1990] 2 NZLR 73 1, the exc lusive dealing 
contract between Fi sher & Paykel and whiteware retailers was not found to s;.:bstanti all y Jes en competiti on. 
There were found to be pro-competiti ve effects of the exc lusi ve dea ling contrac t such as product quality, cos t 
savings, lower real pri ces and higher levels of effi ciency. These were said to furni sh both consumer 
advantage and the protection of Fisher & Paykel's investment from free riding. 
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to protect such arrangements, as they naturally go beyond the scope of the intellectual 
property right. 
G Package Licensing 
Package licensing or block booking as it 1s also known, involves vertical 
arrangements where intellectual property rights are licensed only as a package. This 
occurred in United States v Loew's Inc235 where Iicensors were forced to take less de irable 
films as part of a package with more desirable films. This wa found to be an antitrust 
violation and could substantially lessen competition. 
H Non-Statutory Intellectual Property Rights 
Noticeably absent from the Act are intellectual property exclusions for non-statutory 
or common law intellectual property.236 These include passing off, trade secrets and know 
how. 
It is clear that Parliament's intention when considering reforms of the Act in 1989, 
was to include exclusions for common Jaw intellectual property rights in the Act. In the 
Ministry of Commerce "Review of the Commerce Act 1986", David Butcher, the then 
Minister of Commerce states that section 45 should be redrafted to more precisely reflect 
its original policy intention, namely to provide "[a]n exemption for business a.JTangement 
authorised under intellectual property statutes and related common law".237 
235 United States v Loew 's Inc (1962) 371 US 38. See also Beckman In struments Inc I' Technical 
Development Corp. ( 1970) 433 F. 2d 55, (ih Cir.) where a number of patent were licensed as a package 
when in fact the inventions could be used separately. 
236 When the Act was first passed in 1986, s 45 was much wider than it is now. It was not limited to the 
relevant statutory rights as it is now. Section 45 sets out the scope of the "statutory intellectual property 
right" and the scope of the intellectual properly exemptions in the Act. This exclusion for intellectual 
property extends not only to protected intellectual property rights , but Lo pendi;ig intellectual property rights. 
237 Memorandum for Cabinet Policy Committee above n 151 , 3 (emphasis added). Section 45 was redrafted 
and has remained unchanged since the 1990 amendment to the Act. It is peculiar that when the intention 
seemed clearly to be to include an exemption for common law intellectual property rights, that they were not 
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It is suggested in Brooker's Gault on Commercial Law that there is no reason why 
intellectual property rights, such as passing off or contraventions of the Fair Trading Act 
1986, should be treated differently from statutory intellectual property. This is particularly 
so if it is agreed that the test from Geotherm is appropriate.238 
It is possible that the common law intellectual property rights were left out of the Act 
to encourage traders to register their intellectual property and to use the formal systems set 
in place by the government to protect intellectual property.
239 That is, if traders use the 
statutory intellectual property rights they will gain the benefits of an exclu ion from certain 
parts of the Act.240 
This may be a good incentive to traders to use the statutory intellectual property 
rights. However, common law intellectual property rights, in particular passing off, can be 
very similar to statutory intellectual property rights, and their exclusion from the Act is 
curious. Furthermore, there may be good reasons why an intellectual property rights owner 
. 1 . 1 I I 241 1s re ymg so e yon common aw. 
included in the exemption in the statute. It seems that perhaps for policy reasons, the exemption for "related 
common law" was removed from the amendments. 
238 Ceotherm above n 38. The test is, is there an unreasonable enforcement of a legal right or omething more 
than a reasonable enforcement of a legal right? 
239 In relation to trade marks and passing off. a well known Australian author on the subjects , D.R. Shanahan, 
states in his text Australian Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1990) 
401 "[t]he most effective way of protecting a trade mark is by registration under the Trade Marks Act." This 
is no less true in New Zealand, as the trade mark laws of both countries arc very similar. In relation to trade 
secrets, Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee above n 24, 25 , have stated that it is not 
effective or efficient to rely on common law rights. 
24° For example, traders may be encouraged to use the patent sy tern, rather than to rely on common law 
protection for trade secrets, in order that society can benefit from the public disclosure of the invention, see 
Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee above n 24, 25. 
241 The most likely reason for relying on common law passing off protection rather than trade marks is that 
the word, name or "get up" ("get up" is defined in relation to passing off to be "the dress in which a product 
is presented for sale, that is to say the shape, size and colouring of the conta:'lcr or packaging, the design of 
the label, and to some extent, the design of the product itselr': D.R. Shanahan above n 239, 408.) of a product 
is not ab le to be registered as a trade mark if it docs not meet the criteria et out in the trade marks legislation, 
as happened in Montgomery v Thompson ( 1891) 8 RPC 361 (HL). Cited in D.R. Shanahan above n 239, 40 I. 
Or, that the goods or services concerned are not covered by the trade mark registration. 
68 
I Passing off 
Passing off and trade marks have several similarities.242 Both relate to the same type 
of intellectual property.243
 Both passing off and trade marks are concerned with consumer 
interests.244 
Given that passing off has many similarities to trade mark protection, and that the 
actions can protect the same things, perhaps passing off hould be part of the Act' 
intellectual property exclusions. 
2 Fair Trading Act 1986 
It is common to take a trade mark infringement and/or an action under the Fair 
Trading Act 1986 and/or a passing off action at the same time.245 This demonstrates the 
242 The writer notes that there are important differences between the actions, as well as some similarities. 
243 A passing off action can be taken for a mark, trade name, or get-up of goods. Under the Trade Marks Act 
1953, trade marks can be registered for brand , colours, devices, heading , labels, letters, names, numerals, 
signatures, smells, sounds, tastes, tickets, or words. There is obviou overlap between a mark and a trade 
name between passing off and trade marks. Moreover, brands, colours, devices, headings, labels, letters, 
numerals, signatures, tickets, words and shape can be part of the get-up of goods. This can be seen in the 
variety of get-ups in passing off actions: the hape of a lemon for lemon juice: Reckirr & Coleman Products 
Ltd v Borden Inc [ 1990] All ER 873 (HL); checks on bread packages: Klissers v Harvest Bakeries [ 1988) I 
NZLR 16; domain names: BT pie v One In A Million [ 1998] 4 All ER 476, (CA) and NZ Post v Leng [ 1999] 2 
NZLR 219 and Oggi Advertising v McKen;:,ie Ltd (1999] I NZLR 631; u ing the word "Swiss" as a 
geographical designation for chocolate: Chocsuisse Union Des Fabricants Suisses De Chocolate and Others 
v Cadbury Ltd ( 1998) 41 IPR I. 
244 In relation to passing off it has been said that "Parliament has over the years progressively intervened in 
the interests of consumers and traders so as to impose standards of conduct and to ensure commercial 
honesty.": BT plc v One In A Million [ 1998) 4 All ER 476, 486, (CA) per Aldous LJ. Similarly, in relation to 
trade marks, C.D.G Pickering in Trade Marks in Theory and Practice (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998) 99, 
states "the innuence of the interests of con umers on the law of trade marks is undoubted". The trade mark 
system itself is an instrument of consumer protection, see Anselm Kamperman Sanders and Spyros M. 
Maniatis "A Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Ba ed on Origin and Quality" ( 1993) 11 EAPR 406 in Alison 
Firth, Shelley Lane and Yvonne Smyth ed Readings in Intellectual Property (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
1998) 253. 
245 All the following cases concerned a passing off action, a trade mark infringement action and an action 
under Fair Trading Act 1986, ss 9 and 16: Lel'i Strauss & Co v Kimbyr lnl'estmellls above n 22, Yves Sr 
Laurent Pa,fums v Louden Cosmetics Ltd ( 1997) 39 IPR I I; Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budweiser Budvar 
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overlap between the three action . All actions are about preventing one or more of 
confusing, deceiving, misrepresentative or misleading conduct, which arguably are all 
similar types of conduct. The concern to prevent such behaviour i demonstrated by Cooke 
J (as he was then) in Philip Morris (New Zealand) Ltd v Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co 
(New Zealand) Ltd and Another: "[i]t is undesirable that two different commercial 
organisations should be marketing their competing products under an identical mark."246 
The reason being that consumers may be confused, deceived or misled about the goods or 
services. 
Like trade marks and pa sing off, the Fair Trading Act is concerned with con umer 
protection.
247 
It also includes a specific provision for forging a trade mark.248 
The Fair Trading Act 1986 includes protection for a tatutory intellectual property 
right, yet this intellectual property right i not included a a statutory intellectual property 
right in the Act. As can be seen by the frequency of the use of the Fair Trading Act 1986 
for unauthorised use of trade marks, it is an important right for those trying to a ert 
control of a trade mark. Yet a trade mark owner who uses the Fair Trading Act 1986 to 
prevent unauthorised use of a trade mark (seeking to enforce a trade mark registration) 
would not be able to raise section 36(3) as a defence to an allegation of anti competitive 
conduct under section 36(2) of the Act. This appears anomalous, particularly where the 
Fair Trading Act 1986 has excerpts taken straight from the Trade Marks Act 1953. 
National Corp [200 I] 3 NZLR 666 (HC). The following cases concerned actions under pas ing off and 
sections 9 and 16 of the Fair Trading Act 1986: The $2 Shop v Khatri (July 25, 2000) unreported, High 
Court, Hamilton, CP36-00, Hammond J and Joico Laboratories Inc v Beauty Products Co Ltd ( 1990) 4 
TCLR48. 
246 Philip Morris (New Zealand) Ltd v Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co (New Zealand) Ltd and Another [ 1977] 2 
NZLR 41, 43, per Cooke J. 
247 Under the Fair Trading Act I 986, s 9, no person may in trade, engage in conduct that is mi leading or 
deceptive or is likely to mislead or deceive Using a trade mark that is the ame or similar to one already 
registered, but that does not belong to you, is an example of behaviour that could be misleading or deceptive. 
Gault J in Joico Laboratories Inc v Beauty Products Co Ltd above n 245, 9 tated .. [t]he statute is directed to 
consumer protection and the avoidance of public deception and fine distinctions which might allow conduct 
of that nature to continue unimpeded will be discouraged." 
248 See Annex III. 
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Another situation where thi may be of importance is where the trade mark is 
pending but not registered. In the case of Joico La.boratories Inc v Beauty Products Co 
Ltd
249 
both the first defendant and the first plaintiff claimed proprietorship of the same 
trade mark for the same goods. Both trade marks were pending under the Trade Marks Act 
1953. The first plaintiff alleged that the first defendant had forged the trade mark under 
section 16 of the Fair Trading Act 1986. 
Gault J considered that underlying an allegation of forging a trade mark under 
section 16 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 is an assertion of a ri ght to proprietorship of that 
trade mark.
250 
Yet the proprietorship of the trade mark had not been established under the 
Trade Marks Act 1953. The meaning of a "trade mark" under the Fair Trading Act 1986 is 
the same as that in the Trade Marks Act 1953. However, infringement actions under the 
Trade Marks Act 1953 are only available for regi stered trade marks, not pending trade 
marks. 25 1 
Gault J appears to make it possible to bring an action under section 16 of the Fair 
Trading Act 1986 for forging a trade mark, where no such action is available under the 
Trade Marks Act 1953.252 
It remains unclear whether the Fair Trading Act 1986 is available to prevent 
unauthorised use of a trade mark, where the trade mark application is pending and the 
proprietorship of the trade mark is not established. 253 
249 Joico Laboratories Inc v Beau(v Products Co Ltd above n 245. 
250 Joico Laborarories Inc v Beauty Products Co Ltd above n 245. 
251 Trade M arks Act 1953, ss 6 and 11 . 
252 He states in Joico Laboratories Inc 1• Bea111y Products Co Ltd above n 245, I 0: 
The consequences of the incorporati on into the Fair Trading Ac t 1986 of a ri ght of ci vil action in respect 
of the forging of a trade mark, appears to open the way for proceedings based upon trade mark 
propri etorship before such an appli cati on for registration is determined. Prev ious ly such a proceeding was 
prec luded by sec tion 6 of the Trade M arks Act 1953. 
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If such action 1s available under the Fair Trading Act 1986, then this statutory 
intellectual property right clearly should be included in section 45 of the Act. This is 
particularly true when the Act extends the exclusion for statutory intellectual property 
rights to pending statutory intellectual property rights. If a competitor is merely enforcing 
his or her pending trade mark through a statute, then the exclusions for intellectual 
property included in the Act should apply. 
3 Trade secrets and know how 
Trade secrets and know how, can be protected through the cause of action known as 
"breach of confidence". In relation to breach of confidence Lord Denning observed: 254 
The law on thjs subject ... depends on the broad principle of equity that he who has received 
confidential information in confidence shall nol lake unfair advantage of it. He must nol 
make use of il lo the prejudice of him who gave it without obtaining his consent. 
There is no set definition of confidential information but it can include know how and 
trade secrets. 255 
253 Gault J goes on lo say that at the trial it may be necessary to consider the relationship between Frur 
Trading Act 1986, s 16, and Trade Marks Act 1953, ss 6 and 11. He did not see the need to go into the matter 
al the interlocutory injunction stage. Gault J awarded the interlocutory injunction in favour of the plaintiff, he 
says nol out of concern for the position of the plaintiff. "but in the intere ls of cu lomers": Joico 
Laboratories Inc v Beauty Products Co Ltd above n 245, 15, per Gault J. Unfortunately the ea e never 
proceeded to a full trial, and the matter raised (the interaction between Fair Trading Act 1986, s 16, and Trade 
Marks Act 1953, ss 6 and 11) has not come before the courts again in any other case. 
254 Seagar v Copydex Ltd (No. 1) [ 1967] RPC 349, 368 per Lord Denning. Followed in New Zealand in A B 
Consolidated Ltd v Europe Strength Food Co Ltd [ 1978] 2 NZLR 515, 520 - 521 (CA). 
255 Andrew Brown and Anthony Grant above n 116, 646. Yvonne van Roy above n 55. 343 - 344. For 
example, the following successful claim for breach of confidence could be patentable subject matter or 
relate to know how, particularly considering that patents are merely the registered form of know how: a 
process for scenting paper: Silvercrest Sales Ltd 1· Gainsborough Company Ltd ( 1985) I IPR 123; details of 
a manufacturing process, albeit one where each separate Lcp wa known in the confectionery proccs , bul the 
overall process nol being public knowledge: A B Consolidated Ltd v Europe Strength Food Co Ltd [ 1978] 2 
NZLR 515 (CA); processes for the manufacture of malt extracts and other malt preparations: Wilson Malt 
Extract Co v Wilson [ 1919] NZLR 659. However, u e of information which is the subj ect matter of a 
published patent specification has held not to be confidential information for the obvious reason that the 
specifi cation is publicly available: Bendon Industries Ltd 1• Presslok Industries Ltd (29 October 1982) 
unreported, High Court, Auckland , A883/82 , Barker J. 
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There is an obvious overlap between the protection of trade ecret , know how and 
patents. Some competitors may for whatever reason choose to keep their invention a trade 
secret, thereby relying on the breach of confidence action, rather than protecting their 
invention through patent law. One of the cornerstones of the patent system is the reward of 
a limited monopoly in return for full disclosure of the invention. Clearly if a competitor 
does not wish for his or her invention to be made public, then he or she may choose to rely 
on the breach of confidence action, despite the invention being patentable. A competitor 
may also choose to rely on the breach of confidence action because of its indefinite 
lifespan. 256 
Given the simj)arities between trade secrets and know how and patents, these forms 
of intellectual property should be expressly excluded from the ame parts of the Act as are 
patents, just as has been argued for passing off and Fair Trading Act 1986 actions. 
I Pending Intellectual Property Rights 
Section 45(2) of the Act extends the exclusion for intellectual property rights in 
section 36(3) to pending patent, trade mark, design and plant variety ri ghts. All 
applications are deemed to have been granted. This is in contrast to some of the intellectual 
property rights statutes themselves, where no proceedings can be taken until the right i 
257 granted. 
The Act goes beyond the intellectual property right it elf. Thi s i a presumption that 
the right will be granted during the period when the ri ght are being determined. Thi s 
ensures that future intellectual property right owners do not fa! I foul of the Act while their 
256 Patents are only protected for 20 year . After that the invention is avai lable to a ll and su ndry to 
manufacture. 
257 The Patents Act J 953, s 29(4), provides that an applicant may not institute infringement proceed ings until 
the patent has been sea led . Similarly with t~e Trade Marks Act 1953, s 6( I) and the. Des igns Act 1953, s 7(5). 
The Plant Variety Ri ghts Act 1987 differs in th at s 9( I) of th at Act a ll ows an appli cant for a plant variety to 
take the actions to stop an infringement a an owner could . 
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rights are pending. It seems odd to go further than some of the intellectual property rights 
statutes themselves. 
J Section 7(2) and 7(3) of the Act 
Breach of confidence is not one of the statutory intellectual property rights excluded 
from the Act. Plainly the action is not tatutory. However, section 7 of the Act provides 
that "nothing in this Act linuts or affects any rule of Jaw relating to breache of 
confidence." Section 7(3) further provides "[n]o rule of Jaw referred to in ... subsection 2 
of this section affects the interpretation of any of the provisions of this Act." 
Following section 7(2) of the Act, it appears that nothing in the Act could apply to an 
action for disclosure of a trade secret.258 A trade secret owner who takes breach of 
confidence actions is immune from the Act, even if he or she has a substantial degree of 
power in a market and takes advantage of thi s.
259 
This would appear to be a blanket exclusion for breach of confidence actions that is 
wider than the provisions for statutory intellectual property. It appears anomalous that 
trade secrets could be afforded more protection from the provi sions of the Act than 
. 11 I . h 260 statutory rnte ectua property ng ts. 
258 No deci sion has yet determined the scope of s 7(2) and s 7(3) or their interac ti on. Note that s 7 is based on 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 4M. 
259 Yvonne van Roy states that thi s means that a person has the ri ght to prevent another person from u ing 
information such as trade secrets received from him or her in confidence, even if thi s could also be regard ed 
as anti competitive: Yvonne van Roy above n 55, 343 - 344. 
260 Review of the Commerce Act 1986: a discussion document (Department of Trade and Industry, 
We llington, 1988); Reports and Decisions: a review of the Commerce Act 1986 (Mini try of Commerce, 
We llington , J 989); Review of the Commerce Act 1986: discussion document (Ministry of Commerce, 
Wellington , 1991 ); Review of th e Commerce Act 1986 (Ministry of Co mmerce, Wellington, 1992). 
Amendments to the Co mmerce Act 1986 were made in both 1990 and 200 I . It i poss ibl e that the drafters did 
not consider that know how or trade secrets were confidenti al informati on at the time of drafting the Act. 
There have been everal reviews and subsequent amendments of the Act 1986 since the Act came into force 
though, namely Review of the Commerce Act 1986: a disrnssion document (Department o f Trade and 
Industry, Wellington, 1988); Reports and Decisions: a review of the Commerce Act 1986 (Mini try o f 
Co mmerce, Wellington, 1989); Re,•iew of the Commerce Act 1986: discussion document (Ministry o f 
Commerce, Wellington, 199 1); Re1•iew of the Commerce Act 1986 (Mini try of Commerce, Wellington, 
74 
Yvonne van Roy gives another interpretation of the interaction between section 7(2) 
and section 36. She contends that this preserves the rule of law which apply in actions for 
breach of confidence, and will probably not protect the enforcement of these intellectual 
property rights where enforcement is for one of the anti competitive purposes in section 
36(2).
26 1 
Where such enforcement of a trade secret or know how is taken solely for one of 
the proscribed purposes under section 36(2), then section 7(2) should not protect this 
conduct.
262 
This interpretation is consistent with the other statutory intellectual property 
exclusions.263 
What relevance then does section 7(3) have if section 7(2) appears to exclude trade 
secrets from actions under the Act? Surely if breaches of confidence are excluded from the 
scrutiny of the Act, there would be no need to expressly state that a breach of confidence 
does not affect the interpretation of it? Calhoun and Brown pose a complementary 
interpretation, namely, a rule of law relating to a breach of confidence which otherwi e i 
limited or affected by section 36 is exempted from the operation of section 36 by virtue of 
section 7(2). If exempted, then it therefore cannot affect the interpretation of section 36.264 
Having trade secrets and know how protection in the form of a breach of confidence 
action as part of the intellectual property rights in section 45, is preferable to what appears 
to be a blanket saving to breach of confidence actions in section 7. 
1992). Amendments to the Commerce Act 1986 were made in both 1990 and 200 I. These would have gi ven 
Parliament the opportunity to remedy what appear to be a bl anket exclusion for owner of trade secrets and 
know how that goes beyond other exclusions for intellectual property. 
261 Yvonne van Roy above n 55, 165. 
262 Yvonne van Roy above n 55, 344. 
263 That is, merely enforcing an intellectual property ri ght is not considered to be anti competiti ve, but using 
the right 1o restri ct entry, eliminate other competitors from a market or deter competiti ve conduct may be 
considered anti competitive and subject to scrutiny under the Act. That interpretation is one that well may be 
taken by the courts should a question of enforcement of a trade secret or know how through a breach of 
confidence action be taken, where that action i also considered to be anti -competiti ve. However, it is not one 
that is automatica lly cl ear from a reading of the Act. 
264 Douglas C. Calhoun and Brendan W .F. Brown above n 4, 443. 
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VIII SECTION 43 - ACTS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORISED 
Section 43 states that nothing in Part II of the Act applies in respect of any act, 
manner or thing which is of a kind which is specifically authorised in any Act.265 On one 
interpretation, intellectual property statutes could be considered to "authorise" the 
exercising of rights. 
In Apple Fields Ltd v NZ Apple and Pear Marketing Board,266 the Privy Council 
found that a levy imposed by the Apple and Pear Marketing Board under the Apple and 
Pear Marketing Act 1971 was not " pecifically authorised" by that Act and was likely to 
have anti competitive effect. The Privy Council considered whether the levy provision was 
specific enough to constitute a "specific authorisation" under section 43. The Privy 
Council found that there must be a specific authorisation of the very act in question, not a 
general authorisation by the statute.267 The Privy Council did not consider that every act 
authorised would be anti competitive, but that the "preponderant majority" would be. 
The intellectual property statutes define the nature of the right granted, but do not do 
so in tenns of "authorising". Therefore it seems unlikely that section 43 would act as an 
additional exemption for intellectual property rights owners . 
IX CONCLUSION 
New Zealand has deviated from other countries by having express intellectual 
property exclusions in competition law. These express exemptions, even though it i 
unclear how such exemptions would be treated by the courts, are de irable. These 
exemptions are policy directions that competition law should not be used to curb 
265 Section 43 also includes specifically authorised in any Order in Council. Section 43(2) di stingui shes 
between that which is specifically authorised from that which is generally authorised. 
266 Apple Fields Ltd v NZ Apple and Pear Marketing Board [ 1991] I NZLR 257 (PC). 
267 Apple Fields Ltd v NZ Apple and Pear Mar/...eting Board above n 266, 265. 
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intellectual property rights, unless the intellectual property right owner is seeking to gain 
anti competitive advantages beyond the intellectual property rights themselves. 
Competition law should not be used as a back door method of accessing intellectual 
property rights. 
When examining whether an intellectual property right owner has sought to gain 
anti competitive advantages beyond the intellectual property rights, the strength or 
otherwise of the intellectual property right should not be examined. Competition law must 
presume that the intellectual property right laws have struck the balance correctly when 
granting the rights. The question is whether there has been a reasonable exercise of rights, 
not whether the owner is deserving of those rights. The principle of protecting intellectual 
property rights should override any short term gains to be achieved by increa ed 
competition. Short term increased competition gains may be outweighed by the dynamic 
efficiency realised through protecting intellectual property. 
There may well be "exceptional circumstances" warranting competition Jaw 
intervention, but not where the intellectual property rights owner is exercising hi or her 
rights, even on derivative markets, provided that the owner is merely exercising his or her 
rights. This is consistent with Geotherm where "something more" is required than an 
exercising of statutory rights to fall within section 36. In relation to a mere refu al to 
license, it is difficult to see when such a refusal would tran late into "something more". 
It seems that the Australian approach to exercises of tatutory rights in Warman, 
Ceridale and Cadbury has been followed in New Zealand in Geotherm and Telecom v 
Clear and would be applied to a competition case concerning intellectual property right . 
The United States approach to refusals to licen e is arguably consi tent with New Zealand. 
An unclear picture of the status of refusals to license intellectual property rights i 
presented from Europe, although ea es uch as Volvo, Oscar Bronner and Jngman present 
a strong theme of resisting competition law intervention with intellectual property rights. 
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In relation to licensing, New Zealand has wisely not duplicated the equivalent 
Australian section. The test set out in Transfield though, whether the intellectual property 
rights license seeks to gain collateral advantage , could easily be applied to any 
consideration of section 45 of the Act. The licensing provisions should extend to common 
law intellectual property rights and to the Fair Trading Act 1986. 
Statutory exemptions give intellectual property rights owners certainty about 
exploiting their rights. This certainty should encourage research, development, innovation 
and creativity. While the intellectual property provisions of the Act are not perfect, and it 
unclear how they would function in practice, they should remain in the Act. 
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ANNEX! 
SECTION 36 OF THE COMMERCE ACT 1986 
(1) Nothing in this section applies to any practice or conduct to which this Part applies that 
has been authorised under Part 5. 
(2) A person that has a substantial degree of power in a market must not take advantage of 
that power for the purpose of -
(a) restricting the entry of a person into that or any other market; or 
(b) preventing or deterring a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or 
any other market; or 
(c) eliminating a person from that or any other market. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, a person does not take advantage of a substantial 
degree of power in a market by reason only that the person seeks to enforce a statutory 
intellectual property right, within the meaning of section 45(2), in New Zealand. 
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ANNEX II 
SECTION 45 OF THE COMMERCE ACT 1986 
(1) Nothing in this Part of this Act, except sections 36, 36A, 37 and 38 of thi Act, 
applies -
(a) To the entering into of a contract or arrangement or arnvmg at a 
understanding in so far as it contains a provi ion authori ing any act that 
would otherwise be prohibited by reason of the existence of a statutory 
intellectual property right: or 
(b) To any act done to give effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement, or 
understanding referred to in paragraph (a) of thi subsection. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, a statutory intellectual property 
right means a right, privilege, or entitlement that is conferred, or acknowledged as 
valid, by or under -
(a) The Patents Act 1953; or 
(b) The Designs Act 1953; or 
(c) The Trade Marks Act 1953; or 
(d) The Copyright Act 1994; or 
(e) The Plant Variety Rights Act 1987; or 
(f) The Layout Designs Act 1994. 
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For the purposes of subsection (2) of this section, -
(a) A person who has applied for a patent in accordance with the Patents Act 
1953 and filed the complete specification in relation to the application shall , 
until the application is determined, be deemed to have been granted the patent 
to which the application relates: 
(b) A person who has made an application for the registration of a de ign in 
accordance with section 7 of the Designs Act 1953 hall, until the application 
is determined, be deemed to be the registered proprietor of the design: 
(c) A person who has made an application in accordance with section 26 of the 
Trade Marks Act 1953 for registration of a trade mark hall, until the 
application is determined , be deemed to be the regi tered proprietor of the 
trade mark: 
(d) A person who has made an application in accordance with section 5 of the 
Plant Varieties Act 1987 shall , until the application i determined, be deemed 
to have been granted the plant variety right to which the application relate . 
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ANNEX III 
SECTION 16 OF THE FAIR TRADING ACT 1986 
Certain conduct in relation to trade marks prohibited 
(1) No person shall, in trade,-
(a) Forge any trade mark; or 
(b) Falsely apply to any goods any trade mark or [sign] so nearly resembling a 
trade mark as to be likely to mislead or deceive; or 
(c) Falsely use in relation to the provision of services any trade mark or [sign] o 
nearly resembling a trade mark as to be likely to mislead or deceive.] 
(2) For the purposes of this section a person shall be deemed to forge a trade mark if that 
person-
(a) Without the consent of the proprietor of the trade mark, makes that trade mark 
or a [sign] so nearly resembling that trade mark as to be likely to mi lead or 
deceive; or 
(b) Falsifies any genuine trade mark, whether by alteration, effacement or 
otherwise. 
(3) For the purposes of this Part of this Act-
Sign includes-
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(a) A brand, colour, device, heading, label, Jetter, name, numeral, signature, 
smell, sound, taste, ticket, or word; and 
(b) Any combination of signs: 
Trade mark means a trade mark within the meaning of the Trade Marks Act 1953; 
and includes,-
(a) In the case of goods, any sign used upon or in connection with the goods for 
the purpose of indicating that they are-
(i) Goods of the proprietor of the sign by virtue of manufacture, selection, 
certification, dealing with, or offering to supply; or 
(ii) Goods of a member of a body of persons that is the proprietor of the sign; 
or 
(iii) Goods certified by the proprietor of the sign in respect of origin, material, 
mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristic; and 
(b) In the case of services, any sign used in connection with the provi ion of the 
services for the purpo e of indicating that they are-
(i) Services of the proprietor of the sign; or 
Services of a member of a body of per ons that is the proprietor of the 
sign. 
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ANNEXIV 
SECTION 43 OF THE COMMERCE ACT 1986 
(1) Nothing in this Part of this Act applies in respect of any act, manner, or thing that is, or 
is of a kind, specifically authorised by any enactment or Order in Council made under 
any Act. 
(2) For the purpose of subsection (]) of this section, an enactment or Order in Council does 
not provide specific authority for an act, matter, or thing if it provides in general terms 
for that act, matter, or thing, notwithstanding that the act, mater, or thing requires or 
may be subject to approval or authority by a Minister of the Crown, statutory body or a 
person holding a particular office, or, in the case of a rule made or an act, matter, or 
thing done pursuant to any enactment, approval or authorisation by Order in Council. 
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ANNEXV 
SECTION 51 (3) OF THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 (CTH) 
A contravention of this Part other than section 46, 46A or 48 shall not be taken to have 
been committed by reason of: 
(a) the imposing of, or giving effect to, a condition of: 
(i) a license granted by the proprietor, licensee or owner of a patent, of a 
registered design, of a copyright or of EL rights within the meaning of the 
Circuits Layouts Act 1989, or by a person who has applied for a patent or 
for the registration of a design; or 
(ii) an assignment of a patent, of a registered de ign, of a copyright or of uch 
EL rights, or of the right to apply for a patent or for the registration of a 
design; 
to the extent the condition relates to: 
(iii) the invention to which the patent or application for a patent relates or 
articles made by the u e of that invention; 
(iv) goods in respect of which the design is, or is proposed to be, registered 
and to which it is applied; 
(v) the work or other subject matter in which the copyright subsist ; or 
(vi) the eligible layout in which the EL subsist; 
(b) the inclusion in a contract, arrangement or understanding authorising the u e of a 
certification trade mark of a provision in accordance with rule applicable under Part 
XI of the Trade Marks Act 1955, or the giving effect to . uch a provision; or 
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(c) the inclusion in a contract, arrangement or understanding between: 
(i) the registered proprietor of a trade mark other than a certification trade 
mark; and 
(ii) a person registered as a regi tered user of that trade mark under Part IX of 
the Trade Marks Act 1955 or a person authorised by the contract to use the 
trade mark subject to his or her becoming registered as such a registered 
user; 
of a provision to the extent that it relates to the kinds, qualitie or tandards of goods 
bearing the mark that may be produced or supplied, or the giving effect to the provision 
to that extent. 
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